The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 47 (2009)

Article 6

When Secret Intelligence Becomes Evidence:
Some Implications of Khadr and Charkaoui II
Kent Roach

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Roach, Kent. "When Secret Intelligence Becomes Evidence: Some Implications of Khadr and Charkaoui II." The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 47. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol47/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

When Secret Intelligence Becomes
Evidence: Some Implications of
Khadr and Charkaoui II
Kent Roach*

I. INTRODUCTION
Jim Judd, the outgoing head of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (“CSIS”), has listed “the judicialization of intelligence” as one of
the major changes affecting intelligence agencies. The judicialization of
intelligence is a process in which intelligence agencies have to confront,
often for the first time, “a range of legal issues such as disclosure,
evidentiary standards, and the testimony of intelligence personnel in
criminal prosecutions”.1 Mr. Judd made these remarks on April 15, 2008.
In what is surely an admirable quality in the head of an intelligence
agency, he accurately predicted the future.
A month after Judd’s speech, the Supreme Court of Canada released
its decision in the Omar Khadr case. Subject to subsequent national
security confidentiality proceedings under section 38 of the Canada
*
Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of
Toronto. I thank Anil Kapoor for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
Remarks by Jim Judd, Director of CSIS, at the Global Futures Forum Conference in
Vancouver, April 15, 2008, online: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/nwsrm/spchs/spch15042008-eng.asp>.
He added that such issues
while not startling or novel issues for the legal or police communities, these do have
significant potential implications and consequences for the conduct of intelligence
operations. In some instances, they have also stimulated some interesting debates over the
boundary lines between law enforcement agencies and intelligence services.
He also noted a trend to increased transparency adding that “It is quite likely, I think, that the more
information that goes into the public domain the greater will be the pressure to make even more
known, in the process calling into question the legitimacy of secrecy.” For a somewhat more
optimistic take on the role of courts and intelligence agencies, see Fred Manget, “Intelligence and
the Rise of Judicial Intervention” in Loch Johnson, ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Oxford:
Routledge, 2007). Manget, a former Deputy General Counsel of the CIA, concludes (id., at 340):
The involvement of the federal judiciary is limited but salatury in its effect on executive
branch actions. Nothing concentrates the mind and dampens excess so wonderfully as the
imminent prospect of explaining one’s action to a federal judge … Federal judges are the
essential third part of the oversight system in the United States, matching requirements of
the law to intelligence activities and watching the watchers.
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Evidence Act,2 CSIS would have to disclose the fruits of its interviews
with Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as the information
that CSIS subsequently shared with American officials as a result of
those interviews.3 The very next month, the Supreme Court released
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),4 holding that CSIS
breached its duties under section 12 of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act5 when it destroyed the operational notes of
interviews it conducted with security certificate detainee Adil Charkaoui.
Taken together, these two decisions highlighted that CSIS has constitutional
and statutory duties to retain and disclose secret intelligence.
A third decision, R. v. McNeil,6 decided by the Supreme Court in
early 2009, also fits into the trend of CSIS being subject to increased
disclosure obligations. Although this decision affirmed that not all
government agencies will be subject to R. v. Stinchcombe7 disclosure
obligations, it also held that an “investigating state authority”8 may be
subject to Stinchcombe obligations to disclose the fruits of the
investigation. This raises serious questions of whether CSIS will be held
to be an investigating state authority when it investigates threats to
national security and in particular terrorism. In any event, McNeil
narrows the gap between CSIS being subject to Stinchcombe disclosure
obligations and being subject to R. v. O’Connor9 third party production
obligations by suggesting that the Crown has an obligation to bridge any
gap by inquiring about known and relevant information held by another
agency. Crowns will have to inquire whether CSIS has relevant
information in most terrorism prosecutions.10 The gap was also narrowed
by the Court’s ruling in McNeil that truly relevant information held by
third parties will generally have to be disclosed absent successful claims
of privilege.11
Although Khadr and Charkaoui II were made outside of the criminal
context, they, when combined with McNeil, have implications for the
retention and disclosure of intelligence in terrorism prosecutions. For
2

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Khadr (S.C.C.)”].
4
[2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui II”].
5
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [hereinafter “CSIS Act”].
6
[2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McNeil”].
7
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”].
8
McNeil, supra, note 6, at para. 14.
9
[1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O’Connor”].
10
McNeil, supra, note 6, at paras. 47-51.
11
Id., at para. 41.
3
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example, CSIS’s destruction of intelligence in the Air India trial violated
the accused’s rights12 under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms13 and the recently completed Khawaja terrorism
prosecution featured extensive litigation over whether CSIS intelligence
had to be disclosed to the accused.14 The Court in Charkaoui II
significantly qualifies the traditional idea that CSIS is a security
intelligence agency that should not be concerned with the collection of
evidence or the evidentiary implications of its actions. Although CSIS
was never intended to be and is not a police force, “the activities of the
RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects been converging as
they, and the country, have become increasingly concerned about
domestic and international terrorism.”15 Charkaoui II is a wake-up call
that recognizes the need to interpret the CSIS Act enacted in 1984 in
light of changed circumstances, as Canada has emerged from a Cold War
era, in which intelligence could always be kept secret, into a post-Air
India and September 11 era, in which intelligence investigations of
suspected terrorists can quickly become matters in which arrests and
subsequent legal proceedings are required.
The obligations to retain and possibly to disclose intelligence
imposed on CSIS are broader in Charkaoui II than they are in Khadr.
The Court in Charkaoui II interprets section 12 of the CSIS Act, which
applies to the collection, retention and analysis of all CSIS intelligence
relating to security threats. The Court supports its interpretation of
section 12 by reference to section 7 of the Charter, which it affirms
applies to security certificate proceedings under immigration law because
“the consequences of security certificates are often more severe than
those of many criminal charges”.16 At the same time, however, the
decision remains a general interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act as
it applies to all of CSIS’s activities.
The Court’s decision in Khadr is narrower than Charkaoui. The
ambit of CSIS’s disclosure obligations in Khadr is framed not by section
12
R. v. Malik, [2002] B.C.J. No. 3219 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Malik, [2004] B.C.J. No. 842, 119
C.R.R. (2d) 39 (B.C.S.C.).
13
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
14
Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 648, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 621
(F.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1635, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 3 (F.C.A.);
Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 622, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 547 (F.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Khawaja I”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2008] F.C.J. No. 702 (F.C.).
15
Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 26.
16
Id., at para. 54.
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12 of the CSIS Act or by Stinchcombe,17 but by the precise scope of the
violation of international law that required extra-territorial application of
the Charter. In this sense, the Court’s decision follows the restrictive
approach to the extra-territorial application of the Charter in R. v. Hape.18
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr is also narrower than the Federal
Court of Appeal’s appeal decision in the same case which applied broad
Stinchcombe19 disclosure obligations. It will be suggested in this essay
that the restrictive nature of the disclosure obligation in Khadr is
regrettable because the Court could have defined the disclosure obligation
more broadly while still allowing the government an opportunity to
justify exceptions to it on the grounds that the information was not
relevant to Omar Khadr’s defence or because of particular harms that
disclosure would cause to national security, national defence or international
relations.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II have the
potential to subject CSIS’s secret intelligence to the rule of law, external
verification and adversarial challenge in legal proceedings. The
disclosure of CSIS intelligence provides a vehicle for the objects of
intelligence (or security-cleared special advocates acting on their behalf)
to challenge the accuracy and reliability of intelligence that would
normally not see the light of day. The findings of the Arar Commission
that the RCMP passed on inaccurate and unfair intelligence labelling
Maher Arar and his wife as Islamic extremists associated with Al
Qaeda20 underline the damage that inaccurate intelligence can cause to
individuals in a world where intelligence can be transferred within and
between governments with the click of a send button. The disclosure of
intelligence can serve as another instrument of accountability for CSIS.
Although the Court’s ruling about the importance of retention of
intelligence in Charkaoui could have positive benefits in terms of
increased adjudicative fairness and increased accountability for CSIS, it
could also lead to increased retention of intelligence files and as such
have negative impacts on privacy. If CSIS adjusts its practices to respond
to the new imperatives of retention and disclosure of intelligence, it will
be important that its review bodies remain vigilant that CSIS only collect
17

Supra, note 7.
[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]. For my
criticisms of Hape, see “Hape Creates Charter Free Zones” (2007) 53 Crim. L.Q. 1.
19
Supra, note 7.
20
Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 2006), at 24-25.
18
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intelligence to the extent that it is strictly necessary to fulfil its statutory
mandate. It will also be important that review bodies have the ability to
follow intelligence that CSIS may share with other agencies.
Unfortunately, the Canadian government has still not responded to the
recommendations made by the Arar Commission that were designed to
strengthen the review of national security activities with special attention
to increased information sharing and integration between the RCMP,
CSIS and other agencies with national security responsibilities.21
The Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II should mean that
more intelligence including “raw” intelligence in the form of original and
operational notes and recordings should be retained by CSIS, but it does
not necessarily mean that such intelligence will be disclosed in legal
proceedings. In both cases, the Court stressed that disclosure would not
be automatic and that the government would have an opportunity to
justify non-disclosure on grounds related to the harms that disclosure
would cause to national security. In Khadr, the government could seek
non-disclosure orders under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act and
the Federal Court judge would balance and reconcile the competing
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. In Charkaoui, the Court
accepted that the judge would filter and summarize the intelligence that
could be disclosed to the detainee on standards under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act22 that are even more protective of state
interests in secrecy than those under section 38 of the Canada Evidence
Act because they prohibit the disclosure to the detainee and the public of
all information that, if disclosed, would harm national security or
persons. The Court’s caution in both cases about the actual disclosure of
intelligence to the directly affected person is consistent with the Court’s
caution in other cases about the dangers of disclosing intelligence
especially given Canada’s position as a net importer of intelligence.23
Courts will have to reject the overclaiming of secrecy if the promise of
disclosure of intelligence offered in Khadr and Charkaoui is to be made
real.

21
Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities (Ottawa: Supply and
Services, 2006).
22
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
23
Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.);
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2002] [2007] 1 S.C.R.
350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui I”].
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In order to appreciate the potential magnitude of the change that
could be caused by Khadr and in particular Charkaoui, a little history is
necessary. The second part of this paper will provide an overview of the
evolution of Canadian approaches to secrecy and the use of intelligence
as evidence. The changes in these areas have been rapid and profound.
Until 1982, Ministers were able to assert an essentially unreviewable
discretion to prevent the disclosure of intelligence on grounds of harms
to national security. Although the Federal Court was given jurisdiction to
order the disclosure of intelligence in 1982, it exercised this jurisdiction
very cautiously in the last days of the Cold War, sometimes not even
examining secret intelligence before ordering that it not be disclosed.
In the post-September 11 environment, there are signs of change,
including an increased skepticism to claims that the non-disclosure of
intelligence is justified by concerns about the mosaic effect in which the
disclosure of even innocuous intelligence can assist the enemy. There is
also a recognition that while Canada remains a net importer of
intelligence, it still can and should request foreign agencies to consent to
the disclosure of intelligence. Other factors leading to increased attempts
to obtain the disclosure of intelligence are increased use of security
certificates under the immigration law as a form of anti-terrorism law
and the broad new terrorism offences found in the Anti-Terrorism Act24
which can make much intelligence relevant to the prosecution process.
The third part of this paper will assess the Supreme Court’s decision
in Khadr v. Canada with an emphasis on its holding about the disclosure
of intelligence collected and disseminated by CSIS more than on its
holding about the extra-territorial application of the Charter.25 That said,
it will be seen that the topics are linked because the Court restricted the
ambit of CSIS material subject to disclosure on the basis of its
understanding of the scope of the conduct that violated international law
and required an extra-territorial application of the Charter and a finding
of a Charter violation. The disclosure obligations in Khadr were shaped
by the limited scope of the Charter violation. They were not shaped by
the concern in Stinchcombe that the accused should have access to all
relevant and non-privileged material in order to assist in his or her
defence. A broader definition of what had to be disclosed in Khadr
would not have been determinative because the Court contemplated that
24

S.C. 2001, c. 41.
Benjamin Berger, “The Reach of Rights in the Security State: Some Reflections on
Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice)” (2008) 56 C.R. (6th) 268 [hereinafter “Berger”].
25
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the government would be able to claim national security confidentiality
and other privileges before any information was actually disclosed to
Omar Khadr. Subsequent decisions about the ambit of actual disclosure
in this case will also be briefly examined.
The fourth part of the paper will focus on the Court’s decision in
Charkaoui II with respect to the proper interpretation of section 12 of the
CSIS Act as it relates to the retention of intelligence collected about
individuals and groups. As will be seen, the Court’s interpretation of this
provision was influenced by its interpretation of section 7 of the Charter
and its preference that the Ministers who issue security certificates and
the judges who review security certificates have all of the relevant
information, including raw intelligence, available to them. This part of
the decision was based on a healthy skepticism about relying simply on
CSIS’s analysis and conclusions without verification against the raw
intelligence. Indeed, the Court’s decision that the original intelligence
should be retained was justified in large part on the basis that retention
would allow CSIS, Ministers and eventually judges to verify the
correctness of CSIS’s analysis and conclusions about the raw intelligence
against the original data. The Court took notice of inaccurate intelligence
in both the Maher Arar and Bhupinder Liddar26 cases and made five
references to the need for verification of analysis against original
intelligence in a relatively short 78-paragraph judgment.27 The possibility
26
Mr. Liddar complained to the Security Intelligence Review Committee after being denied
a security clearance necessary for a diplomatic posting.
After reviewing the complaint, SIRC found there was no reasonable basis for that
recommendation, and that it was inaccurate and misleading for several reasons. First,
SIRC concluded that the denial brief contained an unfair and prejudicially inaccurate
account of the information that the Service had in its possession when it began the
security clearance investigation. Next, SIRC concluded that the brief was based on a field
investigation conducted by an inexperienced CSIS investigator, who arrived at unfounded
conclusions. SIRC found that there was no reliable evidence to support a conclusion that
the complainant might engage in activities that would constitute a threat to the security of
Canada, or that the complainant might disclose classified information in an unauthorized
way.
SIRC Annual Report 2005-2006, at 22-23, available online: <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/
2005-2006/index-eng.html> [hereinafter “SIRC Annual Report”]. SIRC noted that the CSIS
investigator was not able to provide it with the answer that Mr. Liddar gave at his security clearance
interview and that this reflected “a long-running concern of the Review committee with respect to
the CSIS practice of destroying the notes that the investigators take of security screening
investigations”. As quoted in Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 40. SIRC recommended that
“CSIS institute procedures to ensure that accurate notes are taken, or that a recording is made, of
security screening interviews. These should be kept for five years after an interview, or for even
longer periods should an interviewee challenge the outcome of a security screening investigation.”
SIRC Annual Report, id., at 22.
27
Charkaoui II, id., at paras 39, 56, 62, 63, 73.
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of inaccurate intelligence conclusions and analysis was definitely on the
Court’s mind when it concluded that CSIS must no longer destroy the
raw intelligence it collects about individuals.
Although the Court stressed the importance of retention and
disclosure of intelligence for adjudicative fairness, its decision will not
mean that security certificate detainees will have direct access to the
intelligence if its disclosure would harm national security or endanger
other persons. As in Khadr, intelligence would be filtered and
summarized in order to protect national security interests before being
disclosed to the detainee. In addition, unfiltered intelligence could be
disclosed to the security-cleared special advocates who have been
appointed in the wake of the Court’s decision in Charkaoui I holding that
the complete lack of adversarial challenge to the intelligence used to
support detention and possible deportation under a security certificate
violated section 7 of the Charter.
The fifth part of this paper will examine some possible harms and
benefits of the judicialization of intelligence promoted by Khadr and
Charkaoui II. I will argue that the judicialization of intelligence is
generally a positive development that is part of an ongoing process of
subjecting CSIS to the rule of law and subjecting its conclusions and
analysis to validation and adversarial challenges that can expose errors,
exaggerations and speculation in analytical conclusions. The retention of
raw intelligence can increase CSIS’s internal and external accountability
by creating the conditions under which its conclusions can be checked
against its raw data. The retention of raw intelligence can also increase
the adjudicative fairness of security certificate proceedings, terrorism
prosecutions and challenges to the denial of security clearances by
facilitating fuller adversarial challenge to the evidence provided by CSIS
and others in such cases. Increased retention of raw intelligence can also
make it easier for CSIS to work with law enforcement agencies.
Although subsequent terrorism prosecutions will still involve section 38
proceedings to determine whether intelligence must be disclosed to the
accused, retention of intelligence can avoid findings that section 7 of the
Charter has been violated by the destruction of relevant intelligence. That
said, the immediate effect of Charkaoui II will be to inspire requests for
remedies for the destruction of raw intelligence pursuant to long-standing
but now invalid CSIS policies.
The judicialization of intelligence is not without its dangers. It could
lend a perhaps unwarranted legitimacy to the use of intelligence as
evidence in the security certificate process. Intelligence, even intelligence
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that is verified against the raw data, may still be speculative. Moreover,
intelligence may still be erroneous if the raw data, data that may have
been collected by a foreign agency, is itself erroneous or is shaped by
confirmation bias or what a number of inquiries into miscarriages of
justice have coined as “tunnel vision”.28 As will be seen, some leading
intelligence practitioners and scholars are starting to recognize that
intelligence collection and analysis may be distorted by a variety of
cognitive biases including confirmation bias.29 Although retention and
disclosure of raw intelligence provides some protection against tunnel
vision, it does not guarantee that the raw intelligence itself will not be
shaped and limited by the cognitive biases and limitations of the
investigators.
In addition, the promise of disclosure offered by Khadr and
Charkaoui II might not be fulfilled if national security confidentiality can
successfully be overclaimed by the government to prevent full disclosure
or if special advocates who receive intelligence are unable to engage in
consultations with detainees and others that may be necessary to provide
effective adversarial challenge to the intelligence.30
The Court in Charkaoui II only partially recognizes the potential
effects of increased retention of intelligence on privacy. The Court
concludes that the risks to privacy by retention of raw intelligence are
justified when CSIS “targets a particular individual or group” as opposed
to conducting investigations “of a general nature”.31 This distinction
recognizes the demands of adjudicative fairness, but the Court may not
have fully appreciated how many CSIS investigations target individuals
or groups. The most recent public information about CSIS targeting
practices suggests that over 90 per cent of the targets of CSIS
28
On tunnel vision, see Fred Kaufman, Proceedings into the Proceedings Against Guy Paul
Morin (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1998). On the general applicability of learning about miscarriages
of justice in the field of terrorism, see Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the
War Against Terror” (2005) 109 Penn. State L. Rev. 967.
29
Richard J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (New York: Nova Publishers,
2006), at 28, 41, 59, 175 [hereinafter “Heuer”]. The author of this book worked for the CIA from
1951 to 1979, retiring as the head of the methodology unit for the Director of Intelligence. Id., at 7.
The book devotes five chapters to various forms of cognitive biases that can affect the analysis of
intelligence including confirmation bias. It concludes that “significant biases in the evaluation of
intelligence estimates are attributable to the nature of human mental processes, and not just to selfinterest and lack of objectivity, and that they are, therefore, exceedingly difficult to overcome.” Id.,
at 175.
30
Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “A Bismarckian Moment: Charkaoui and Bill C-3”
(2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 355; Gus Van Harten, “Charkaoui and Secret Evidence” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 251.
31
Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 43.
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investigations are individuals or groups as opposed to issues or events.32
If this continues to be the case, and there is no reason why CSIS should
not focus on individuals and groups as opposed to issues and events, it
will be very important that CSIS observes the limits of its statutory
mandate when engaging in targeted investigations and that its review
bodies remain vigilant to these limits.

II. THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE
AND PUBLIC EVIDENCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO MASS TERRORISM
Intelligence agencies have not traditionally had to worry about the
disclosure of intelligence in legal proceedings. Intelligence was collected
to be distributed within government to those with appropriate security
clearances. Espionage and other prosecutions that might involve the
disclosure of intelligence were possible but exceedingly rare. Until 1982,
those who collected intelligence in Canada could be secure in the
knowledge that the government could assert absolute secrecy claims to
protect intelligence from disclosure.
1. The Cold War and Absolute Secrecy
In 1982, the Quebec Human Rights Commission attempted to
challenge the invocation of national security privilege when investigating
the reasons why a switchboard operator and a waitress had been
dismissed for security reasons from their jobs working at the 1976
Montreal Olympics. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
dismissed the Commission’s challenge to the absolute national security
provisions then in force under section 41(2) of the Federal Court Act.33
The provision precluded judges from even examining material once a
Minister of the Crown certified that the disclosure of the document
would be injurious to international relations, national defence or security.
The Commission’s arguments at the time were not without force. Its
enabling statute clearly gave the Commission all the powers of a superior
court and the common law in Britain had already moved away from an
absolute understanding of national security confidentiality.34

32
33
34

SIRC Annual Report, supra, note 26, Table 3, at 38.
R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910 (H.L.).
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Justice Chouinard for a unanimous Court upheld the absolute
privilege on the basis that “saying that Parliament and the legislatures
cannot make the privilege absolute amounts to a denial of parliamentary
supremacy”.35 He also quickly dismissed a Canadian Bill of Rights
challenge on the basis that while the absolute privilege “does of course
create in favour of the Crown, the guardian of the nation’s higher
interests, a regime which differs that applicable to individuals”,36 the
result did not infringe the right of individuals to equality before the law.
It is difficult to imagine a decision that was more the antithesis of the
rule of law and accountability than this decision by the Supreme Court.
Yet this decision was made only 27 years ago and in the year that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed in force.
Although judges after 1982 were given the power to review secret
information to determine whether it should be disclosed, old habits died
hard. In 1984, the Federal Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the nondisclosure of secret information that former RCMP officers claimed
could provide them with a defence with respect to charges that they had
stolen the Parti Québécois’ membership list. The Court of Appeal
approved of the non-disclosure of information that it had not even
examined, with Le Dain J.A. expressing doubts about the competence of
the Court to determine the sufficiency and adequacy of restrictions on
disclosure and Marceau J.A. stating that “to accept that national security
and international relations be injured, even to only the slightest extent, in
order that such a remote risk of extreme incredulity on the part of 12
members of a jury be avoided, would appear to me, I say it with respect,
totally unreasonable.”37
A similar categorical if not cavalier approach to the preference of the
state’s interests in protecting secrets over the accused’s interests was
demonstrated the next year when those accused of terrorism were denied
access to CSIS surveillance material on them despite the possibility that
the surveillance could possibly have revealed exculpatory material such
as the whereabouts of the Toronto-based accused who were accused of
an attempted assassination of a Turkish official in Ottawa. Again, the
Federal Court chose not to exercise its new powers to look at the secret
documents. Justice Addy of the Federal Court refused to allow the
Director of CSIS to be cross-examined on his affidavit and held that
35
Canada (Commission des droits de la personne) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1982]
S.C.J. No. 3, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 215, at 228 (S.C.C.).
36
Id., at 230.
37
Goguen v. Gibson, [1984] F.C.J. No. 13, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 492, at 511 (F.C.A.).
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the mere fact that Parliament has chosen to allow this court to consider
an objection to disclosure on grounds of national security, national
defence or international relations when the subject matter was
previously within the exclusive realm of the executive arm of
government, is not any indication that it is any way less important than
before the statutory enactment.38

In other cases, Addy J. expressed concerns that pursuant to the so-called
mosaic effect, the disclosure of even innocuous information could harm
national security and that great danger could be caused by the disclosure
of any of CSIS’s methods, targets or members.39 The accused’s attempts
to obtain disclosure was dismissed as “a fishing expedition” with the
judge opining that the accused’s attempt to use intelligence material to
impugn the credibility of a witness was “merely a side issue” in a
criminal trial.40 The trial judge in this case eventually held that a fair trial
was still possible in light of non-disclosure, but expressed considerable
unease with the fact that only specially designated judges of the Federal
Court could examine the information and no judge had in fact examined
the secret information in this case.41
2. Emerging Rights to Disclosure
There were some decisions in the 1980s that demonstrated the
possibility that intelligence might have to be disclosed in order to respect
the Charter rights of the accused to disclosure and to make full answer
and defence. For example, Watt J. held that disclosure was necessary in a
case involving Talwinder Singh Parmar, widely believed to have been
the mastermind of the 1985 Air India bombings that killed 331 people.
He reasoned that even if the accused’s disclosure requests were the
proverbial “fishing expedition”, they were now one that was conducted
in “constitutionally protected waters”.42 In the wake of his ruling that a
wiretap warrant could not be supported by material involving a
confidential source that was not disclosed to the accused, the prosecution
against Parmar and others alleging a conspiracy to commit acts of
38
Re Kevork, [1984] F.C.J. No. 178, 17 C.C.C. (3d) 426, at 431 (F.C.T.D.). See also Re
Gold, [1986] F.C.J. No. 1039, 25 D.L.R.(4th) 285 (F.C.A.), also not examining the documents.
39
Henrie v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1988] F.C.J. No. 965, 53
D.L.R. (4th) 568, at 579-80, affd [1992] F.C.J. No. 100, 88 D.L.R.(4th) 575 (F.C.A.).
40
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41
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terrorism in India was abandoned. Around the same time in the late
1980s, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered that an affidavit used to
obtain a wiretap under the CSIS Act should be disclosed to the accused.
Once inaccuracies in the affidavit were revealed as a result of its
disclosure, the then Director of CSIS Ted Finn resigned and another
conspiracy to commit terrorism prosecution was abandoned.43 CSIS’s
initial experience with court ordered disclosure was not a happy one.
3. The Origins of the CSIS Act
There was a tendency at the time that CSIS was created in 1984 to
stress the differences between the collection of intelligence as opposed to
evidence. This emphasis was related to the desire not to give the new
civilian intelligence agency law enforcement powers. Although the
McDonald Commission recognized that a security intelligence agency
might have to work with law enforcement with respect to matters such as
espionage, terrorism and subversion, it stressed “fundamental differences
between most police work and security intelligence responsibilities …
The main product of security intelligence work takes the form of advice
to both government and regular police forces” consisting of “raw
information” and “analysis”.44 The implicit assumption, so entrenched
that it was not mentioned, was that intelligence would be secret.
Other parts of the McDonald Commission also reflected Cold War
assumptions. For example, it stated that “by far the most important”
reason behind the “need to know” principle “is the need to minimize the
damage of an unknown penetration by an enemy agent”.45 The
McDonald Commission recognized that section 41 of the Federal Court
Act allowed Ministers of the Crown to withhold information from the
courts on the grounds that disclosure of the information would harm
national security.46
Much of the debate that followed the McDonald Commission’s
report and led to the enactment of the CSIS Act in 1984 stressed
differences between police and security intelligence work. One of the
prime differences was that the work of the police would eventually
become public and subject to challenge in court while the work of
43
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security intelligence agencies would remain secret. The most frequently
quoted passage in this regard was the following statement taken from a
Special Senate Committee chaired by Michael Pitfield that reported in
1983. The Pitfield Committee stated:
Law enforcement is essentially reactive. While there is an element of
information-gathering and prevention in law enforcement, on the whole
it takes place after the commission of a distinct criminal offence. The
protection of security relies less on reaction to events; it seeks advance
warning of security threats, and is not necessarily concerned with
breaches of the law. Considerable publicity accompanies and is an
essential part of the enforcement of the law. Security intelligence work
requires secrecy. Law enforcement is “result-oriented”, emphasizing
apprehension and adjudication, and the players in the system — police,
prosecutors, defence counsel, and the judiciary — operate with a high
degree of autonomy. Security intelligence is, in contrast, “informationoriented”. Participants have a much less clearly defined role, and
direction and control within a hierarchical structure are vital. Finally,
law enforcement is a virtually “closed” system with finite limits —
commission, detection, apprehension, adjudication. Security intelligence
operations are much more open-ended. The emphasis is on investigation,
analysis, and the formulation of intelligence. 47

In this passage, a stark contrast was drawn between the reactive work of
the police and the proactive work of security intelligence agencies. This
discounted the crime prevention role of the police as well as their
responsibility to enforce the law with respect to inchoate offences such
as conspiracies and attempts. The Pitfield Committee ignored the
overlapping jurisdiction of the police and security intelligence agencies
with respect to terrorist plots that would be both threats to the security of
Canada and crimes. The Committee also assumed that all of the work of
the police would be made public and discounted the ability of the legal
system to protect some intelligence from disclosure through devices such
as public interest immunity and evidentiary privileges. At the same time,
it also assumed that all security intelligence required secrecy. This
assumption made some sense with respect to the counter-intelligence
work of a security intelligence agency in the Cold War, but much less
sense with respect to terrorist threats.

47
Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence,
Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1983), at 6, para. 14.
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The CSIS Act itself also placed considerable emphasis on
maintaining the secrecy of intelligence. Although it gave those denied
security clearances the right to complain to the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (“SIRC”), complainants do not have a right to be
present during SIRC hearings48 and SIRC is bound by all the security
requirements and secrecy oaths that apply to CSIS employees.49 The
secrecy of spying is also acknowledged in section 18 of the CSIS Act.
The section makes it an offence, subject to some exceptions, to disclose
information obtained under the Act that could reveal the identity of
confidential sources of information or employees engaged in covert
operational activities. That said, section 19 of the CSIS Act contemplated
from the start that intelligence could be relevant to police investigations
and prosecutions and might have to be disclosed to that end.
Nevertheless, section 19 provides CSIS with a discretion not to disclose
such intelligence. To the extent that intelligence is used for preventive
purposes, there was a reasonable expectation that it could remain secret
forever and not have to be disclosed to directly affected people or the
public in legal proceedings.
4. Changing Approaches to Secrecy
As discussed above, the emphasis on fair trial rights and disclosure
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms exerted some
pressure in the late 1980s towards the disclosure of intelligence. This
pressure came in prosecutions launched in the wake of the 1985
bombings of Air India, events that resulted in the deaths of 331 people in
what was, before September 11, 2001, the most deadly act of aviation
terrorism in history. Even after September 11, however, there were some
who clung to Cold War era ideas that secrecy was an absolute value and
that CSIS’s security intelligence mandate meant that it did not collect
evidence or have to worry about the evidentiary effects of its practices
including its frequent destruction of raw intelligence. In his 2003 John
Tait memorial lecture, then CSIS Director Ward Elcock returned to many
of the ideas expressed 20 years earlier by the Pitfield Committee when he
stated:
Law enforcement is generally reactive; it essentially takes place after
the commission of a distinct criminal offence. Police officers are
48
49

CSIS Act, s. 48(2).
Id., s. 37.

162

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

results-oriented, in the sense that they seek prosecution of wrong doers.
They work on a “closed” system of limits defined by the Criminal
Code, other statutes and the courts. Within that framework, they often
tend to operate in a highly decentralized mode. Police construct a chain
of evidence that is gathered and used to support criminal convictions in
trials where witnesses are legally obliged to testify. Trials are public
events that receive considerable publicity.
Security intelligence work is, by contrast, preventive and informationoriented. At its best, it occurs before violent events occur, in order to
equip police and other authorities to deal with them. Information is
gathered from people who are not compelled by law to divulge it.
Intelligence officers have a much less clearly defined role, which works
best in a highly centralized management structure. They are interested
in the linkages and associations of people who may never commit a
criminal act — people who consort with others who may be a direct
threat to the interests of the state.
CSIS officers make no arrests, but call upon the police of jurisdiction if
apprehension is required. Their work environment is an open-ended
world of nuance and shades of meaning. Information is not collected as
evidence at trial but as input to the decision-making centres of
government. Management control is vital in this work so that individual
investigators’ insights are frequently cross-checked by others,
preventing personal bias from clouding the results. Finally, it is
conducted in secret so that peoples’ identities and reputations are
protected and in order to protect the policy options of the state.
Because of its open-ended, subtle and confidential nature, security
intelligence work requires a close and thorough system of control and
accountability in which political responsibility plays a large part.
The Special Senate Committee remarked in 1983 that security work
requires a different background than police work ... one that is embodied
in a new type of recruit with a different outlook and education,
emphasizing analytical and assessment skills. Events that resulted in the
creation of the CSIS Act and the Service also led the Committee to
conclude that a civilian organization would best assure the necessary
political control.50

In this passage, the then Director of CSIS reiterated the stark dichotomy
between reactive policing and proactive and secret intelligence that had
been articulated 20 years earlier in the Pitfield Report. There was little, if
Ward Elcock, “The John Tait Memorial Lecture”, October 2003, online: <http://www.
csis-scrs.gc.ca/nwsrm/spchs/spch17102003-eng.asp>.
50
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any, recognition that CSIS would have to change in response to its
overlapping jurisdiction with the RCMP with respect to the activities of
suspected terrorists that could also be crimes, including the many new
crimes of facilitating and financing terrorism and participating in a
terrorist organization that Canada created shortly after September 11.51
The above approach with its emphasis on secrecy and the idea that
CSIS does not collect evidence can be contrasted with that taken by Bob
Rae in his 2005 review of the Air India bombing. Rae observed that at
the time of the creation of CSIS in 1984 “counter-intelligence (as
opposed to counter-terrorism) took up 80 per cent of the resources of
CSIS. The Cold War was very much alive, and the world of counterintelligence and counter-espionage in the period after 1945 had created a
culture of secrecy and only telling others on a ‘need to know’ basis
deeply pervaded the new agency.” Rae commented on the dangers of
excessive secrecy and a silo-based approach in which security
intelligence and the police were reluctant to share information.
Reflecting on CSIS’s destruction of wiretaps and original notes that were
held by Josephson J. in the Air India trial to have violated the rights of
the accused under section 7 of the Charter, Rae commented that:
If an agency believes that its mission does not include law enforcement,
it should hardly be surprising that its agents do not believe they are in
the business of collecting evidence for use in a trial. But this misses the
point that in an age where terrorism and its ancillary activities are
clearly crimes, the surveillance of potentially violent behaviour may
ultimately be connected to law enforcement. Similarly, police officers
are inevitably implicated in the collecting of information and
intelligence that relate to the commission of a violent crime in the
furtherance of a terrorist objective. 52

Rae’s approach recognized that CSIS’s original attitudes towards secrecy
were rooted in the Cold War and that a changed threat and legal
environment meant that in some cases intelligence would have to be
disclosed in legal proceedings or even used as evidence.
The 1983 Pitfield Report was considered by the Supreme Court in
Charkaoui II. The Supreme Court accurately noted that the Pitfield
Report “stressed the distinction between the policing function and the
role of an intelligence agency. Law enforcement agencies generally react
to the commission of criminal offences, whereas those responsible for
51
52
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prevention and for the protection of security must try to anticipate
threatening events”.53 Significantly, however, the Court suggested that
the stark dichotomy between security intelligence and policing made in
the Pitfield Report and accepted by Noel J. in his ruling in Charkaoui II
that CSIS was not subject to any disclosure duty because it was not a
police force54 was no longer quite accurate. Justices LeBel and Fish
stated:
CSIS is not a police force. This is clear from the legislative history set
out above. In reality, however, it must be acknowledged that the
activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects been
converging as they, and the country, have become increasingly
concerned about domestic and international terrorism. The division of
work between CSIS and the RCMP in the investigation of terrorist
activities is tending to become less clear… 55

This was an important recognition by the Supreme Court that both the
threat and legal environment had significantly changed since 1983. In
short, Canada had moved from the Cold War to an age in which security
intelligence and the police must work together to prevent lethal acts of
mass terrorism. In such an environment, CSIS can no longer afford to
destroy intelligence in the name of secrecy.
There are signs of increased recognition that a secrecy culture that
may have been necessary to avoid penetration by the KGB during the
Cold War may not be appropriate today. The Federal Court has
abandoned its prior practices of not examining secret information. In a
number of decisions it has expressed skepticism that reliance on the Cold
War concept of the mosaic effect — namely, that the disclosure of
innocuous information may still benefit the enemy — can in itself justify
non-disclosure on national security grounds.56 The Federal Court has also
recognized that while the third party rule still appropriately prevents the
disclosure of information provided in confidence to Canada by foreign
agencies that Canada should request the foreign agencies to consider
providing their permission for the subsequent disclosure of information.
The Court has also recognized that the third party rule should not be used
53
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to prevent the disclosure of intelligence that is already in the public
domain.57 Justice O’Connor has warned about the dangers of overclaiming
secrecy because of its adverse effects on the fairness and transparency of
proceedings, as well the credibility of the government’s attempt to protect
secrets that must be protected.58
In his 2008 John Tait Lecture, John Sims, the deputy Attorney
General of Canada, reflected on the 1983 Pitfield dichotomy between the
secret work of intelligence agencies and the public work of the police
when he stated that
the primary mandate for the new security intelligence agency was
intended to be the provision of confidential “intelligence” to government
decision-makers. This model remained workable so long as the
objective was limited to the penetration and prevention of espionage
and other long-term threats to the security of Canada. In retrospect, it is
almost quaint to recall the UK’s traditional unwillingness to even
acknowledge the existence of its security intelligence agencies.

He went on to
contrast this affinity for secrecy with the judicial system. The courts are
traditionally grounded on principles of openness, transparency and
public accountability. Fairness requires full disclosure of the case to be
met, and public hearings before an independent, unbiased adjudicator.
The rule of law, constitutionalism, and primacy of the rights of the
individual are all salient features of this paradigm. 59

Intelligence agencies in the 21st century operate in a much more
transparent manner than they did in the 1980s. For example, the British
domestic security service, MI5, not only has a website, but the website
recognizes that Security Service officers have testified in criminal
trials involving terrorism and that, subject to valid claims of public
interest immunity, intelligence may have to be disclosed in terrorism
prosecutions.60 Mr. Sims’ comments, like those of the Supreme Court in
Charkaoui II, reflect a growing appreciation that it is no longer realistic
to imagine that security intelligence will never have to be disclosed in
57
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legal proceedings, especially legal proceedings involving allegations of
terrorism as opposed to espionage. Changes in Canada’s legal and threat
environment mean that secret intelligence will increasingly also be
evidence or other material that may have to be disclosed in legal
proceedings that attempt to detain, deport or punish suspected terrorists.

III. THE COURT’S DECISION IN KHADR
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr is best known for its
decision that the Charter applied to the activities of CSIS officers who
interviewed Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My focus here will
not be on the reasons why the Court held that the Charter had extraterritorial application, but rather on the disclosure of intelligence
collected by CSIS. As will be seen, however, the two issues are not
easily separated because the ambit of disclosure was limited by the
Court’s understanding of the nature of the Charter and international
human rights breaches that required the extra-territorial application of the
Charter.
Omar Khadr was captured in Afghanistan when he was 15 years of
age. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay Cuba since October,
2002. His legal status has changed with the various changes in the legal
regime that governs those detained at the American military base, but
Mr. Khadr now faces charges of murder, attempted murder conspiracy,
support of terrorism and spying under the Military Commissions Act.61 If
convicted, Khadr could face life imprisonment and could potentially
have faced the death penalty but the American government has decided
not to seek a death sentence.
As explained in a recent decision finding that Khadr’s section 7
rights had been violated by the Canadian government’s continued refusal
to request his return to Canada, “the events surrounding Mr. Khadr’s
arrest in July 2002 are disputed. Clearly, he was present during a gunbattle near Khost, Afghanistan, during which a United States soldier was
killed by a grenade. Mr. Khadr is alleged to have thrown the grenade. He
maintains that he did not.”62 No allowance was made for Khadr’s youth
and he was initially denied consular access at Guantanamo. CSIS agents
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interviewed Khadr at Guantanamo while aware that he had been
subjected to a so-called “frequent flier” program of sleep deprivation.63
1. The Case for Broad Disclosure Rights
Given the serious nature of the charges faced by Khadr, the harsh
conditions of his confinement and the fragmentary and disputed nature of
the evidence in his case, he had a strong case when he requested from the
Canadian government full disclosure of all documents possessed by the
Crown, including records of the interviews that Canadian officials
conducted with Khadr at Guantanamo. Although the judge of first
instance found that there was not enough of a causal connection between
Canadian investigative actions and the American proceedings against
Khadr, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision and held that
the Crown’s broad disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe applied in
this case, subject to valid privilege or national security confidentiality
claims that might be made by the Crown.
Justice Desjardins stressed the breadth of disclosure and stated that
[a] failure to disclose relevant information impedes an accused’s ability
to make full answer and defence and creates the risk of an innocent
person being convicted and imprisoned. As one of the principles of
fundamental justice, the right to make full answer and defence has been
entrenched in the section 7 protection of the right to life, liberty and
security of the person.64

The Federal Court of Appeal decided this case before the Supreme Court
placed new restrictions on the extra-territorial application of the Charter
in R. v. Hape.65 It concluded that Khadr could receive full disclosure
without interfering with the sovereignty of the United States because it
would be up to the Americans to decide if any of the evidence was
admissible in their own proceedings and to devise their own discovery
process. The Federal Court of Appeal also recognized that the Attorney
General of Canada could claim national security confidentiality before
any actual disclosure was made.66
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The Supreme Court initially seemed to articulate a broad right to
disclosure when it stated:
Canada has an obligation under s. 7 to provide disclosure to Mr. Khadr
to mitigate the effect of Canada’s participation by passing on the
product of the interviews to U.S. authorities. It is not clear from the
record before this Court if all portions of all of the interviews were
given to U.S. authorities. If Mr. Khadr is given only partial disclosure
of the interviews on the ground that only parts of the interviews were
shared with U.S. authorities, it may be impossible for him to evaluate
the significance of the parts of the interviews that are disclosed to him.
For example, by analogy with Stinchcombe, disclosure of an inculpatory
statement shared with the U.S. authorities might require disclosure of
an exculpatory statement not shared to permit Mr. Khadr to know his
jeopardy and prepare his defence. It would seem to follow that fairness
requires disclosure of all records in any form of the interviews
themselves — whether or not passed on to U.S. authorities — including
any transcripts, recordings or summaries in Canada’s possession. For
similar reasons, it would seem to follow that Mr. Khadr is entitled to
disclosure of information given to U.S. authorities as a direct
consequence of Canada’s having interviewed him.67

In this passage, the Court seemed to endorse a broad approach to
disclosure that borrows from its refusal in Stinchcombe to draw a
distinction between the need to disclose inculpatory or exculpatory
material. The Court in Stinchcombe68 recognized that what material was
exculpatory could depend on the perspective of the participant and for
that reason endorsed a broad rule that all relevant information be
disclosed. The wisdom of this rule has been affirmed by subsequent work
on tunnel vision and confirmation bias which suggests that investigators
filter much of the information that they collect through cognitive biases
that interpret evidence as consistent with the suspect’s guilt and resist
classifying information as exculpatory. The Supreme Court was thus
correct to suggest that even if only inculpatory material was shared with
the United States, “fairness requires disclosure of all records in any form
of the interviews themselves”.69
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2. Limiting Disclosure to the Scope of the International Human
Rights Breach
Having suggested a rationale for broad disclosure patterned on
Stinchcombe, the Court resiled from the principle that Stinchcombe
would apply directly to CSIS even though such an approach had been
endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Court reasoned that:
Our holding is not based on applying Stinchcombe directly to these
facts. Rather, as described above, the section 7 duty of disclosure to
Mr. Khadr is triggered on the facts of this case by Canadian officials’
giving U.S. authorities access to interviews conducted at Guantanamo
Bay with Mr. Khadr. As a result, the disclosure order we make is
different in scope than the order of the Federal Court of Appeal. The
appellants must disclose (i) all records in any form of the interviews
conducted by Canadian officials with Mr. Khadr, and (ii) records of any
information given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence of
Canada’s having interviewed him. This disclosure is subject to the
balancing of national security and other considerations as required by
ss. 38 ff. of the Canada Evidence Act.70

The Court reiterated the idea that disclosure was limited to the two
categories articulated above in a subsequent part of the decision.71 The
rationale for this restrictive approach seems to be that only information
derived from the interviews at Guantanamo would constitute a violation
of international human rights law and the Charter that required extraterritorial application of the Charter, something that has been seen as
extraordinary after the Court’s decision in R. v. Hape.72 In this way, the
Court’s restrictive approach to the extra-territorial effect of the Charter
limited and narrowed disclosure rights and obligations under section 7 of
the Charter.
Although the scope of the disclosure requirements in Khadr were
limited by the extent of the Charter violation, it is significant that the
disclosure obligations applied to information that was collected for
intelligence purposes. Justice Mosley addressed this issue in his
subsequent decision by noting:
Questions have arisen in these proceedings as to whether the visits had
a law enforcement aspect, about which there is some dispute between
the Attorney General and Mr. Khadr’s counsel. The former Deputy
70
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Director of Operations for CSIS was cross-examined on the point in the
course of earlier proceedings. From what I have seen, it appears clear
that the interviews were not conducted for the purpose of assisting the
US authorities with their case against Mr. Khadr or for building a case
against him in Canada. I note that no law enforcement personnel were
authorized to attend at that time. The information collected during the
interviews was provided to the RCMP for intelligence purposes.
However, it is equally clear that the US authorities were interested in
having Canada consider whether Khadr could be prosecuted here and
provided details about the evidence against him to Canadian officials
for that purpose. Nonetheless, the interviews by Canadian officials
were conducted for intelligence collection and not evidence gathering. 73

The Court’s ruling in this respect affirms the principle that intelligence
may be subject to disclosure even if the intelligence was not collected for
law enforcement purposes. This should dispel any residual ideas in CSIS
that the organization is exempt from disclosure obligations because it
does not have a statutory mandate to collect evidence. That said,
disclosure of intelligence is far from automatic and CSIS will have an
ability under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain nondisclosure orders. One discipline on the breadth of the non-disclosure
orders in criminal cases, namely, the ability of the trial judge to stay
proceedings or order other remedies to the extent that the accused’s right
to a fair trial is infringed,74 will not be present in Omar Khadr’s case if he
is not subject to trial in Canada.
3. Subsequent Proceedings Reveal the Truncated Disclosure
Obligation
In subsequent proceedings in the Federal Court to determine the
exact extent of disclosure, Mosley J. recognized that there was some
ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s approach to disclosure. He stated that
“at first impression”, the Court’s reference to the Stinchcombe principle
of disclosing all relevant information without regard to what was actually
passed on to American authorities “would appear to leave open the
possibility that the designated judge could apply a Stinchcombe
relevance test to the redacted documents in the collection”.75 However,
73
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he ultimately held that the disclosure obligation was limited to the two
categories of records of the interviews of Khadr by Canadian officials
and records of any information given to the Americans as a direct
consequence of the Canadian interview. Thus, Mosley J. concluded that
“the field of inquiry conducted by this Court has been considerably
narrowed” and did not include “information in the collection which may
have been considered relevant to the criminal charges under
Stinchcombe” that had been “provided by U.S. agencies for intelligence
and law enforcement purposes unrelated to the visits by Canadian
officials to Guantanamo”.76
The result of this narrowing exercise was that only five of 186 pages
of interview notes and witness statements fell within the Supreme
Court’s order even though all 186 pages would be relevant under
Stinchcombe disclosure principles.77 Thus the limited ambit of the extraterritorial application of the Charter established the limits for the
disclosure. Stinchcombe relevant material that was unrelated to the
Guantanamo interviews was not subject to disclosure even though such
material was shared with the Americans and might have been relevant
and useful to Omar Khadr in his defence.
Although Mosley J.’s subsequent ruling on the scope of the
disclosure is based on an accurate and careful reading of the Court’s
judgment, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the result is to
undercut the idea that fairness required broad disclosure to enable Khadr
to better prepare his defence. Causation principles have limited the
disclosure requirement because the disclosure requirement only applies
to information about Khadr shared with the Americans “as a direct
consequence of Canada’s having interviewed him”. This restrictive
approach discounts Khadr’s interests in knowing all the information that
Canada shared with the United States in order to better defend itself. To
be sure, such information should not be disclosed if it was not relevant to
the charges faced by Khadr or was subject to a valid privilege claim.
These are matters that Mosley J. could have determined by reviewing the
file with the help of arguments from the Attorney General of Canada and
the security-cleared special counsel. Nevertheless, Mosley J. found that
such a review of the whole file was not necessary because the Supreme
Court had categorically limited the ambit of disclosure by requiring that
the disclosure obligations would be limited to information obtained from
76
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the interviews or shared with the Americans as a result of the interviews
and no more. In short, disclosure was limited to reflect the extent of the
Charter and international human rights violation that required extraterritorial application of the Charter.
4. The Workability of Broader Disclosure Requirements
The restrictive nature of the Court’s disclosure obligations in Khadr
discounts the work that relevance and privilege could do in ensuring that
Khadr only gained access to CSIS information that would be relevant to
his defence and would not be excessively damaging to Canada’s national
security and international relations interests. For example, information
that CSIS shared with the Americans about the activities of the Khadr
family after Omar Khadr’s capture and detention would arguably not be
relevant to his defence of the charges that he faced in American
proceedings. Such a finding would have protected any ongoing
investigations into other members of the Khadr family.
Most of the attention in cases and commentary has been paid to the
breadth of Stinchcombe disclosure obligations, but there are limits to
these obligations. For example, in 1995 the Supreme Court ruled that an
accused could not have access under Stinchcombe to wiretaps that may
have involved the accused on unrelated charges.78 In the follow-up
proceedings from the Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr, Mosley J.
recognized limits to Stinchcombe when he stated:
It must be stressed that much of the redacted information in the
documents produced to the Court does not relate to the applicant and
would not assist him in defending himself against the criminal charges
at Guantánamo. A considerable amount of this information refers to
investigations concerning other persons unrelated to the applicant. This
information would be irrelevant under the Stinchcombe standard.79

Even if information shared with the Americans but unrelated to the
Canadian interviews at Guantanamo had satisfied Stinchcombe
requirements of relevance, the Attorney General of Canada would still
have the opportunity to claim national security confidentiality privilege
over such documents. The dominant test under section 38 is one that
generally defers to the Attorney General’s claims that the disclosure of
information would harm national security or international relations and
78
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requires the applicant to demonstrate that the harms of non-disclosure
clearly outweigh the harms of disclosure.80 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
the Khadr case recognized the important safeguard that section 38
provides to the government of Canada to prevent disclosure of otherwise
secret material with respect to the more limited category of material that
was directly related to the Guantanamo interviews when it stated:
it is not possible on the record before this Court to determine what
specific records should be disclosed to Mr. Khadr. In order to assess
what specific documents must be disclosed as falling within the group
of documents described in para. 37, a designated judge of the Federal
Court must review the documents. The designated judge will also
consider any privilege or public interest immunity claim that is raised,
including any claim under ss. 38 ff. of the Canada Evidence Act.81

As noted above, the Federal Court of Appeal had applied the broader
Stinchcombe standard of disclosure, but also had reserved the ability of
the government to justify selective non-disclosure under section 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act or other privileges.82
In subsequent proceedings in this case, Mosley J. applied section 38
of the Canada Evidence Act, which allows a designated judge to balance
the competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure of the
information and concluded that the appropriate balance would require
some editing of the videotapes of the interview of Khadr by Canadian
officials at Guantanamo. The editing would prevent disclosure of the
facial images of the Canadian officials and the disclosure of certain
sensitive information that was not revealed in the public judgment.
Justice Mosley concluded:
I am satisfied that disclosure of the sensitive audio content and the
facial images would cause injury to Canada’s national interests and that
there is no public interest in the disclosure of this information that
outweighs the interest in non-disclosure. I have been advised that the
DVDs could be edited to remove the audio containing the sensitive
information and the identities of the officials/agents could be obscured.
With those measures taken, any potential injury that might result from
release of the tapes to Mr. Khadr’s defence team would be mitigated.83
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Similar measures could presumably have been taken if the Court had
applied full Stinchcombe disclosure obligations.
5. Disclosure Only for Citizens?
One final restriction on the disclosure obligations articulated in
Khadr is that they seem to be restricted to Canadian citizens even though
section 7 of the Charter and Stinchcombe include non-citizens.84 The
reference to Khadr’s citizenship was made by the Federal Court of
Appeal85 in its ruling in the case which, as discussed above, held that
Stinchcombe would apply and was made before the Supreme Court
restricted the extra-territorial application of the Charter in Hape. In a
subsequent decision about two other detainees held at Guantanamo and
alleged to have been interviewed by CSIS and RCMP officials in 2003
and 2004, the Federal Court has distinguished the Supreme Court’s
decision in Khadr on the basis that the applicants were not Canadian
citizens. Justice Blanchard concluded “the Court is not prepared to
extend the Charter’s reach beyond that which has already been decided.
The Applicants are not Canadian citizens. They have failed to establish
the required connection to Canada. Consequently their circumstances
cannot engage a section 7 Charter right.”86 This is another example of
disclosure rights being limited by the extent of the Charter’s extraterritorial application.
6. The Tensions Between Khadr and Stinchcombe and Singh
Although the Court’s decision in Khadr has resulted in some
disclosure of intelligence to Omar Khadr, it is limited by the restrictions
that the Court placed in Hape87 on the extra-territorial application of the
Charter. Indeed, the Hape-inspired limitations in Khadr have created
tensions with two landmarks in earlier section 7 jurisprudence: Singh88
and Stinchcombe.89
84
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 202 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
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Khadr is in tension with Stinchcombe because the disclosure
obligations in the former case are much narrower than Stinchcombe’s
requirement that all relevant and non-privileged material be disclosed to
the accused. The Court in Khadr does not reject the application of
Stinchcombe on the basis that the proceedings that Omar Khadr faces in
the United States are not criminal or will not result in severe
consequences for Mr. Khadr. Such an approach would run counter to the
Court’s recognition in other cases including Charkaoui II90 that section 7
is not limited to criminal proceedings and that some administrative
proceedings in the anti-terrorism realm may have more severe
consequences than criminal proceedings. Indeed, the likelihood that
Khadr will not be subject to an ordinary criminal prosecution with its
traditional safeguards makes the need for disclosure even more
compelling.
The court rejects Stinchcombe disclosure rights in Khadr because it
sees disclosure not as a right but as a remedy that is limited and defined
by the extent of a Charter and international human rights violation that
requires the extraordinary extra-territorial application of the Charter. As
suggested above, such restrictions on disclosure can only be explained
with reference to Hape. Moreover, they are unfortunate and unnecessary
because the Stinchcombe limits of relevance and privilege would have
given the government an ample opportunity to justify selective nondisclosure of material to Khadr.
By introducing the novel concept that section 7 rights are enjoyed
only by Canadian citizens, Khadr also stands in tension to a long line of
section 7 decisions starting with Singh which stress that section 7 rights
are enjoyed by everyone and not just by Canadian citizens. Here again
the only likely explanation for this doctrinal innovation seems to found
in the Hape-inspired idea that courts must be cautious and restrictive in
applying the Charter in an extra-territorial manner. The result may be
that only Canadian citizens can claim the benefits of the extraordinary
extra-territorial application of the Charter. Even accepting the need to
establish some nexus to Canada, the citizenship category is a blunt and at
times arbitrary one. A permanent resident may in some cases have a
closer nexus to Canada than a citizen. In any event, limiting disclosure to
citizens is in tension to the reference to everyone in section 7 of the
Charter and the Charter’s relatively sparing use of citizenship as a
category that defines the ambit of Charter rights.
90
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In the end, Khadr is something of a hollow victory for disclosure and
section 7 of the Charter because it limits the scope of section 7 rights and
of disclosure through its Hape-inspired understanding of the
extraordinary nature of extra-territorial application of the Charter. Khadr
limits key section 7 concepts of broad disclosure rights and universal
personhood even while it finds that section 7 has been violated and CSIS
intelligence should be disclosed given the particular and limited
circumstances in which CSIS participated in a violation of Omar Khadr’s
rights under international human rights law and the Charter. The message
to CSIS seems to be that intelligence obtained abroad may have to be
disclosed, but only to the extent that CSIS violates international human
rights in a manner that requires the extra-territorial application of the
Charter. The message to Omar Khadr is that the Court recognizes that his
Charter rights were violated by CSIS participation in an international
human rights violation, but that he will only receive disclosure of
information that can be causally connected to the violation. Moreover,
the government can still oppose such limited disclosure for reasons of
national security confidentiality.

IV. THE COURT’S DECISION IN CHARKAOUI V. CANADA
The issue in Charkaoui was whether a person subject to a security
certificate had a right to obtain notes of interviews conducted with him
by CSIS in 2002. Adil Charkaoui was told that disclosure was impossible
because the original notes had been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy
once the CSIS officers had completed their analytical reports. Mr.
Charkaoui argued that he was entitled to the notes and a stay of
proceedings or release as an appropriate remedy. He also asked that new
evidence introduced by the Minister in 2005 be excluded. He received
none of these remedies from the courts, but the Supreme Court did affirm
that CSIS had a statutory and constitutional duty to retain and disclose
the notes of their interviews with him.
1. The Trial Judgment
Justice Noël of the Federal Court rejected Charkaoui’s argument that
his rights had been violated and that he was entitled to a remedy under
the Charter. His judgment stressed that security certificates were not
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criminal proceedings and that CSIS was not a police agency subject to
disclosure obligations. He concluded that there was
no breach of procedural fairness as defined in section 7 of the Charter,
the facts and allegations in the present proceeding not being based on
these summaries. Nor, for the same reasons, is it necessary to discuss
the role of CSIS in the investigation, other than to say that CSIS is not a
police agency and that it is not its role to lay charges. As such, it cannot
be subject to the same obligations as those attributed to a police force.
Moreover, we are dealing here with immigration law, not the criminal
law. The standpoint is different: see Blencoe v. British Columbia
(Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 88, in
which Mr. Justice Bastarache, on behalf of the majority, states: “This
Court has often cautioned against the direct application of criminal
justice standards in the administrative law area. We should not blur
concepts which under our Charter are clearly distinct.” See also
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 711; R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.91

Justice Noël’s 2005 decision was consistent with the idea articulated by
the Pitfield Committee and discussed in the first part of this paper that
stressed the distinctions between proactive and secret security
intelligence and reactive and public policing. It also seemed to rely on
the Court’s 1992 decision in Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) v. Chiarelli92 for the proposition that the security certificate
process was consistent with the Charter even if it did not allow any
adversarial challenge to the intelligence that the Ministers submitted in
secret ex parte hearings to justify the issuance of the security certificate.
This idea was rejected by the Supreme Court in its first Charkaoui
decision in 2007.93
2. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of CSIS’s Evolving Role
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment by LeBel and Fish JJ.,
allowed Charkaoui’s appeal and held that subject to editing by the
reviewing judge, Charkaoui should have access to the original interview
notes. The Court took a much more nuanced approach to the stark
contrast between policing and security intelligence work than that taken
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in 1983 by the Pitfield Committee or by Noël J. in the decision that was
the subject of the appeal. For example, the Court stated:
Indeed, CSIS is not a police force. This is clear from the legislative
history set out above. In reality, however, it must be acknowledged that
the activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects
been converging as they, and the country, have become increasingly
concerned about domestic and international terrorism. The division of
work between CSIS and the RCMP in the investigation of terrorist
activities is tending to become less clear than the authors of the reports
discussed above seem to have originally envisioned.
.....
In this light, we would qualify the finding of the Federal Court that
CSIS cannot be subject to the same duties as a police force on the basis
that their roles in respect of public safety are, in theory, diametrically
opposed. The reality is different and some qualification is necessary. 94

The Court, through reference to the Arar Commission Report, took
judicial notice of the changed circumstances in which CSIS operates
especially since the events of September 11. In this context, it is no
longer realistic or practical for CSIS to rely on the idea that intelligence
must always remain secret or that it does not collect evidence. Although
the jurisdictions of CSIS and the RCMP have from the start overlapped
at least with respect to terrorist conspiracies, the enactment of many new
terrorism offences in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act has increased the
degree of overlap.
3. CSIS’s Policy to Destroy Raw Intelligence
The Court considered a CSIS policy that required the destruction of
operational notes. The rationale for the policy was the confidential nature
of intelligence operations and the harm to national interests and affected
persons that could be caused by the disclosure of intelligence. The only
exception in the CSIS policy to the destruction policy was when
retention of the original information was necessary because information
such as a sketch or diagram could not be transcribed into an analytical
report and when the information “may be crucial to the investigation of
an unlawful act of a serious nature and employees may require their
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notes to refresh their memories prior to recounting the facts of an
event”.95
The CSIS policy was first adopted in December 1994 and had been
subject to only minor changes since that time.96 The CSIS policy was
consistent with a Cold War mentality that valued secrecy above almost
all other competing values. Although the policy made some allowance
for the possibility that CSIS officers might have to testify in some serious
terrorism prosecutions, it did not contemplate that CSIS officers would
have to testify and present their work product in security certificate
proceedings.
4. Section 12 of the CSIS Act
The Court found that the CSIS policy was based on an erroneous
reading of section 12 of the CSIS Act. Section 12 is a critical component
of the CSIS Act, but one that has received little if any judicial scrutiny. It
provides:
The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent
that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and
intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in
relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.

Section 12 restricts collection of intelligence by CSIS by requiring that
the investigation relate to “activities that may on reasonable grounds be
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada” as defined in
section 2 of the CSIS Act. Even where such a reasonable suspicion
exists, section 12 places a further restraint that CSIS only collect
information “to the extent that it is strictly necessary”. The reference to
strictly necessary in section 12 follows recommendations made by the
McDonald Commission that a civilian security intelligence agency
should respect principles of proportionality in the collection of
intelligence so as to avoid the excesses of the RCMP’s Security Service,
which collected intelligence about opposition political parties and other
forms of legitimate and lawful dissent in a democracy.
Although the “strictly necessary” qualifier seems in both a
grammatical and purposive sense to qualify the reference in section 12 to
95
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the collection of intelligence and not its subsequent retention or analysis,
there was some ambiguity about the proper interpretation of section 12.
For example, CSIS’s policy requiring the destruction of operational notes
except in very limited cases might have been supported by arguments
that the retention as well as the collection of intelligence should be
limited by the “strictly necessary” qualification. The Supreme Court
decisively rejected this argument in Charkaoui II by stating:
Nothing in this provision requires CSIS to destroy the information it
collects. Rather, in our view, s. 12 of the CSIS Act demands that it
retain its operational notes. To paraphrase s. 12, CSIS must acquire
information to the extent that it is strictly necessary in order to carry out
its mandate, and must then analyse and retain relevant information and
intelligence. In short, OPS-217 rests on an erroneous interpretation of
s. 12.97

The Court then proceeded to give a number of purposive or functional
justifications for its interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act as
requiring the retention of properly collected information. One
justification was the need for precision and accuracy in intelligence as
stressed by the Arar Commission in connection with its findings that
inaccurate intelligence about Maher Arar and his wife had been shared
with the Americans. Justices LeBel and Fish stated that:
The original operational notes will be a better source of information,
and of evidence, when they are submitted to the ministers responsible
for issuing a security certificate and to the designated judge who will
determine whether the certificate is reasonable. Retention of the notes
will make it easier to verify the disclosed summaries and information
based on those notes. Similarly, it is important that CSIS officers retain
access to their operational notes (drafts, diagrams, recordings,
photographs) in order to refresh their memories should they have to
testify in a proceeding to determine whether a security certificate is
reasonable — a proceeding that is not mentioned in OPS-217.98

In this way, the Court noted that security certificates made use of
intelligence as evidence and that such evidential uses of intelligence
would require CSIS to adjust their retention policies to observe
evidentiary standards.
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5. Section 7 of the Charter
The Court interpreted section 12 of the CSIS Act in light of section 7
of the Charter and the security certificate context in which Adil
Charkaoui asked for disclosure of the notes taken of CSIS interviews
with him. Building on a theme expressed in its first Charkaoui case,99 the
Court rejected the idea that section 7 rights were confined to the criminal
justice system. Instead, the Court stated:
But whether or not the constitutional guarantees of section 7 of the
Charter apply does not turn on a formal distinction between the
different areas of law. Rather, it depends on the severity of the
consequences of the state’s actions for the individual’s fundamental
interests of liberty and security and, in some cases, the right to life. By
its very nature, the security certificate procedure can place these rights
in serious jeopardy, as the Court recognized in Charkaoui. To protect
them, it becomes necessary to recognize a duty to disclose evidence
based on s. 7.100

The Court then took note that CSIS investigations “play a central role in
the issuance of a security certificate” and that “the consequences of
security certificates are often more severe than those of many criminal
charges”.101 The context of the case made the need to retain the original
notes pressing.
The Court also stressed the importance of retaining original notes so
that both the Ministers who issue security certificates and the judges who
review the reasonableness of the certificates would have an opportunity
to verify CSIS’s analysis and conclusions against the original data.
Justices LeBel and Fish stated:
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational
notes compromises the very function of judicial review. To uphold the
right to procedural fairness of people in Mr. Charkaoui’s position, CSIS
should be required to retain all the information in its possession and to
disclose it to the ministers and the designated judge. The ministers and
the designated judge will in turn be responsible for verifying the
information they are given.102
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The Court returned to the theme of verification when in the course of
holding that Ministers could submit new evidence to support the security
certificate, the Court stated that “receiving new evidence in the course of
this ongoing verification process is fairer, since such evidence can be as
beneficial to the named person as to the ministers”.103 The importance of
verifying the conclusions and analysis of intelligence analysts will be
discussed in the last part of this paper. With respect to section 7 of the
Charter, however, the Court’s emphasis on verification is also supported
by other section 7 jurisprudence which recognizes the possibility of error
and unreliable evidence that can result in the detention of innocent
persons.104
6. Is Charkaoui II Based on Section 12 of the CSIS Act and/or
Section 7 of the Charter?
The ultimate decision by the Court with respect to the duty to retain
and disclose the original notes is a product of statutory interpretation of
section 12 of the CSIS Act as influenced by the values of section 7 of the
Charter and the principles of procedural fairness. The Court made
reference to Charter values even though it did not recognize there was an
ambiguity when the statute was interpreted in a purposive manner as
required by cases such as Bell Express Vu Limited Partnership v. Rex.105
Although the decision may be stronger by being supported by
multiple legal sources, the amalgam nature of the ruling makes the
decision less clear than it might have been. There may be a tendency in
some quarters to read the decision narrowly as limited to the security
certificate context that engages section 7 of the Charter and particular
concerns about the procedural fairness of the decisions made by
Ministers and reviewing judges in that process. Such an approach would,
however, discount the Court’s interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS
Act which applies to all of CSIS’s intelligence-collection activities. In
this vein, it is important to reiterate that the Court said that the reference
to intelligence in section 12 refers not only to “summaries prepared by
officers” but also to “original operational notes” that are a “better source
103
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of information, and of evidence”106 than the analytical summaries.
Moreover, the Court clearly stated that nothing in section 12 “requires
CSIS to destroy the information it collects. Rather, in our view, section
12 of the CSIS Act demands that it retain its operational notes. To
paraphrase section 12, CSIS must acquire information to the extent that it
is strictly necessary in order to carry out its mandate, and must then
analyse and retain relevant information and intelligence”.107 The Court’s
decision that CSIS should retain intelligence was rooted in section 12 of
the CSIS Act and it would be a mistake to limit the Court’s holding to
the security certificate process that engaged liberty and security interests
under section 7 of the Charter.108 For example, the Court cited a decision
by SIRC that had complained about the destruction of original notes in
the context of a denial of a security clearance to Mr. Liddar. It also cited
the Arar Commission with respect to the importance of accuracy and
precision when intelligence is shared with other countries.109 Both of
these contexts have nothing to do with security certificates. The Court’s
interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act should apply across the
board to all of CSIS’s activities and not be limited to the security
certificate context.
Other agencies involved in the security certificate process such as the
Canadian Border Service Agency and Immigration Canada, however,
should take note of the Court’s comments about the importance of
retention and disclosure of information given that the “consequences of
security certificates are often more severe than those of many criminal
charges”.110 Even without the statutory re-enforcement of section 12 of
the CSIS Act, those agencies may in some contexts have an independent
obligation under section 7 of the Charter to retain and disclose relevant
information to security certificate detainees. In short, there are two
independent legal theories that support the conclusion that material must
be retained for possible disclosure: the Court’s interpretation of section
12 of the CSIS Act and its interpretation of the requirements of section 7
of the Charter and closely related notions of procedural fairness. Both
theories applied on the facts of Charkaoui II, but each separate theory on
106
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its own could support a conclusion that material should be retained for
possible disclosure.
7. Privacy and the Distinction Between General and Targeted
Investigations
Although the Court interpreted section 12 of the CSIS Act to
authorize the retention of properly collected intelligence, the Court did
not deal directly with the restrictions that section 12 places on the
collection of intelligence. This is unfortunate because a likely response to
the Court’s decision will be that CSIS will retain much more raw
intelligence. Indeed, modern computer technology would potentially
allow CSIS to retain massive amounts of raw intelligence in excess of the
prior holdings of the RCMP’s Security Service which were criticized by
the McDonald Commission and civil libertarians.111
The Court was not completely oblivious to privacy values in
Charkaoui II and it observed:
The argument based on the importance of protecting privacy applies
primarily to general investigations. Where targeted investigations are
concerned, the interests at stake differ. Privacy should of course be
respected, but not to the point of giving inaccurate or unverifiable
information to the ministers and the judge. In the context of the
procedures relating to the issuance of the security certificate and the
review of its reasonableness, it may prove necessary to disclose notes
to the ministers and the designated judge.112

The Court’s implicit assumption seems to be that the main danger to
privacy comes from “general investigations” that do not involve named
individuals and groups. Hence, the duty to retain intelligence does not
apply in such investigations.
The Court’s concern that general investigations pose a threat to
privacy makes intuitive sense. For example, a CSIS investigation into
certain forms of political or religious activity or dissent could result in
the investigation of those who were only engaged in legitimate activity
or dissent or those who may have simply associated for social, economic,
religious or political reasons with an individual or group that could be a
For a concrete example of some of the material collected and retained by the RCMP’s
Security Service, see “Former RCMP Security Service Files on René Lévesque Now Available”,
containing numerous press clippings and some heavily redacted material. Online: <http://www.
collectionscanada.gc.ca/whats-new/013-314-e.html>.
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legitimate target of a CSIS investigation. In addition, the need to retain
intelligence to promote adjudicative fairness is less pressing because
enforcement actions ranging from the denial of a security clearance, to
the issuance of a security certificate or a criminal prosecution are
unlikely to result from a general investigation that does not focus on a
specific individual or group.
Although it recognized that privacy concerns could still be in play
with respect to targeted investigations of specific individuals and groups,
the Court concluded that in such cases the balance of interests differed.
In other words, concerns about accurate decision-making and adjudicative
fairness favoured the retention of the original intelligence over the values
of privacy. The need to retain accurate information in targeted investigations
would also presumably extend to specific persons who were not targets
of the investigation. For example, Maher Arar became a person of
interest in an investigation of another target. A person denied a security
clearance might have an interest in knowing what others said about him
or her. Leaving aside the possibility that CSIS might target persons who
are not legitimate targets because, for example, they simply engage in
political or religious dissent, there is a possibility that the retention of
information about those who associate with legitimate targets will adversely
affect their privacy.
The distinction that the Court relies upon with respect to general
versus targeted investigations raises the question of how CSIS actually
conducts its investigations. Unfortunately, there is limited public
information about CSIS’s targeting practices. The 2005-2006 annual
report of the Security Intelligence Review Committee contains some
interesting information about the authorized targets of CSIS investigations.
In that year, there were 594 authorized targets, with 335 of the targets
being for counter-terrorism and 192 being for counter-intelligence. Only
40 of the 594 authorized targets were identified as “issues/events” as
opposed to individuals or organizations.113 If the Court in Charkaoui II
was making reference to this distinction, it appears that more than 90 per
cent of CSIS’s targeted investigations relate to individuals and groups.
Such investigations would then engage the duty to retain and possibly
disclose intelligence articulated in Charkaoui II. It is possible, however,
that the Court was distinguishing between all targeted investigations,
including those perhaps that target issues and events as opposed to
113

SIRC Annual Report, supra, note 26, Table 3, at 23. Unfortunately, similar data is not
included in the 2006-2007 or 2007-2008 annual SIRC reports or in the CSIS annual reports.
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individuals and organizations, and the other activities in which CSIS
engages, such as open source research and the like. In either event, these
figures suggest that the exemption of general investigations from the
duty to retain and disclose may do little work in protecting privacy.
A finding that CSIS devotes most of its investigations to targeted
individuals or groups is not a criticism of CSIS’s targeting decisions.
Given limited resources and the risks of targeting legitimate dissent when
one focuses on issues and events, it may be proper for CSIS to focus on
specific individuals and groups who may be involved in activities that
threaten the security of Canada. The targeting of events and issues could
in some cases raise concerns about targeting legitimate political dissent
or religious activity. The main point is simply that the Court may have
(1) underestimated that the vast majority of CSIS investigations appear to
target specific individuals and groups; and (2) overestimated the extent to
which the exemption of “general” investigations from the duty to retain
intelligence will protect privacy. If this is indeed the case, it will be very
important for CSIS and its review bodies to ensure that targeting
decisions are made carefully and legally, because once a group or an
individual is targeted, it is now likely as a result of Charkaoui II that the
raw intelligence on that person will be retained indefinitely.114
8. Privacy and the Limits on Collection of Intelligence in Section 12
of the CSIS Act
Fortunately, there are some restrictions in the CSIS Act that are
designed to protect privacy. Section 12 of the CSIS Act instructs CSIS
that it shall collect information and intelligence with respect to “activities
that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to
the security of Canada”. In this way, CSIS must demonstrate that there is
a reasonable suspicion related to threats to the security of Canada as
defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act. The structure of section 12 of the
CSIS Act follows the recommendations of the McDonald Commission,
which stressed the importance of a statutory definition of the mandate of
a new civilian security intelligence in order to ensure that the new agency
respected legitimate dissent in a democracy and to ensure that its
activities were subject to the rule of law.
114
The Court does not address how long intelligence should be retained and there may be a
case for legislation or regulation to address this issue which will also involve the related issue of the
preservation of CSIS records for archival historical research.
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Even when CSIS is investigating reasonably suspected threats to the
security of Canada, section 12 of the CSIS Act places an additional
restriction on its activities: information and intelligence are to be
collected “to the extent that it is strictly necessary”. The reference to
necessity follows recommendations made by the McDonald Commission
that the activities of a new civilian security intelligence agency should be
guided by principles of proportionality. Principles of proportionality
have subsequently played an important role under the Charter, most
notably in relation to the justification of reasonable limits on Charter
rights under section 1 of the Charter. There is little jurisprudence that
illuminates either the meaning of threats to the security of Canada as
defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act or the precise nature of the “to the
extent that it is strictly necessary” limitation in section 12 of the CSIS
Act. The Supreme Court in Charkaoui II did not attempt to fill this gap
or to flesh out how restrictions in section 12 of the CSIS Act should
govern the collection of intelligence, which under its ruling is now likely
to be retained by CSIS for much longer periods. The Court’s failure to do
so is unfortunate because it would have naturally flowed from its
discussion of privacy and the retention of intelligence. Although some
defend minimalist rulings in the national security area,115 national
security issues are rarely litigated116 and the Court can provide important
guidance in the few that are litigated.
Given the possible adverse effects that increased retention of
intelligence could have on privacy values, it would have been helpful for
the Court to have provided some guidance about the proper interpretation
of the rest of section 12 of the CSIS Act, particularly as it related to the
collection of intelligence. Although section 12 is the centrepiece of the
CSIS Act and has been in place for a quarter of a century, there still has
been no definitive judicial interpretation of when activities are
reasonably suspected of being a threat to the security of Canada or when
the collection of intelligence is strictly necessary to investigate such
threats.117 In the absence of such guidance from the Court, much of the
work in defining the limits of its mandate will fall on CSIS and review
bodies such as SIRC and the Privacy Commissioner. The increased
Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War” [2004] Sup. Ct. Rev. 47.
The Court has only interpreted the CSIS Act in two other cases arising from a denial of
security clearance and an access to information request. See Thomson v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No.
13, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385 (S.C.C.) and Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), supra, note 23.
117
Section 12 has been interpreted as not authorizing extra-territorial searches: see Re X,
2007 Carswell Nat 5260.
115
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retention of intelligence that will be promoted by Charkaoui II makes it
only more important that the intelligence be legally and properly
collected in the first place.
9. What Should Be Disclosed and to Whom?
As in Khadr, the disclosure authorized in Charkaoui II was far from
absolute. The Court at several junctures noted that the reviewing judge
would still be obliged under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
not to disclose to Charkaoui any material that if disclosed could harm
national security or endanger any person.118 Indeed this standard is more
restrictive than the standards under section 38 of the Canada Evidence
Act that were applied in Khadr and would be applied in cases arising
from McNeil119 that may require the disclosure of CSIS information in
terrorism prosecutions. Under section 38 the designated judge is allowed
to balance and reconcile the competing interests in disclosure and nondisclosure whereas under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
that designated judge is absolutely prohibited from disclosing any
information to the detainee that would harm national security or any
individual. In reality, this means that much of the intelligence in security
certificate cases that is subject to disclosure under Charkaoui II will be
disclosed to the security-cleared special advocates created in the wake of
Charkaoui I and not to the actual detainees and their lawyers.
Although Khadr, Charkaoui II and McNeil all send definite and
important signals to CSIS about the need to retain original intelligence
and its possible disclosure in subsequent legal proceedings, all of the
decisions recognize that disclosure will not be absolute. All three
decisions provide the government an opportunity to justify nondisclosure on grounds relating to harms to national security. In the
security certificate context, it is likely that a significant amount of the
raw intelligence will not be disclosed to the detainee on the basis that its
disclosure would harm national security or other persons, including those
who have collected the intelligence. In such instances, the raw intelligence
118

Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at paras. 45, 63, 77.
Supra, note 6. CSIS information could be subject to disclosure in a terrorism prosecution
on the basis (1) that CSIS was an investigating agency directly subject to Stinchcombe; (2) that the
Crown knew about prior CSIS investigations and had a duty to seek and disclose relevant
information or; (3) on the basis that the evidence was truly relevant in the criminal trial even if CSIS
is classified as a third party not directly subject to Stinchcombe. The Court in McNeil recognizes that
disclosure can be prevented in all three scenarios by a valid claim of privilege.
119
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will be disclosed to the special advocate, who must then obtain judicial
permission in order to consult the detainee or others when necessary to
make inquiries about the context in which the raw intelligence was
collected.
The disclosure of more raw intelligence to the special advocates will
likely result in more requests by special advocates to presiding judges to
allow them to contact the detainees about the meaning and accuracy of
the raw intelligence. It may also lead the special advocates to seek
permission from the judge to share the raw intelligence with intelligence
experts who can opine on the meaning and reliability of the raw intelligence
and whether it supports the analytical conclusions drawn from it by CSIS
and others. Although the Court stresses the value of the retention of the
raw intelligence in allowing Ministers and reviewing judges to verify the
analytical conclusions drawn by CSIS, this process will be assisted by
the adversarial challenge that has been promoted by the special advocates
created in the wake of Charkaoui I.
10. Remedies for Failure to Retain and Disclose Intelligence
Although CSIS should respond to Charkaoui II by changing its
policy to destroy intelligence, the immediate challenge in many security
certificate and other proceedings may be to devise remedies for the
failure to disclose raw intelligence that CSIS has already destroyed. As
discussed above, Adil Charkaoui sought both the exclusion of evidence
and a permanent stay of proceedings as remedies for CSIS’s failure to
retain and disclose intelligence in the form of the original notes of
interviews with him.
The Court rejected the request for a stay of proceedings stressing that
the stay should be “a remedy of last resort”120 and that it was premature
to issue such a drastic remedy while the proceedings were ongoing. The
Court also noted that the designated judge had granted an appropriate
remedy when he had postponed proceedings in response to late
disclosure in 2005 of the summary of CSIS interviews with Charkaoui in
early 2002.121 This approach is consistent with the Court’s restrictive
approach in criminal cases with respect to granting stays of proceedings

120
121

Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 76.
Id., at para. 67.
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as a Charter remedy.122 The Court only briefly adverted to its own
extensive jurisprudence on breaches of the duty to retain evidence that
has been developed in the criminal context123 and it warned about the
need for a contextual approach. CSIS’s destruction of intelligence in
targeted investigations after the Court’s decision in Charkaoui II will
likely be found to be unacceptable negligence under R. v. La.124 The
issue of whether there was unacceptable negligence may have to be
litigated in the many cases where the intelligence was destroyed before
Charkaoui II. In a sense, Charkaoui was given the retroactive benefit of
the Court’s ruling in his case as is the general rule in litigation.125
The task of devising an appropriate remedy was delegated to the
reviewing judge who would hear evidence from those who took the
interview notes. Given that much relevant intelligence will likely have
already been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy in Charkaoui and the
other security certificate cases, the task of devising appropriate and just
remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter for any section 7 violations
caused by the destruction of relevant intelligence will only add to the
already onerous litigation that surrounds the use of security certificates
based on allegations of involvement with terrorism. In some cases, the
presiding judge may have to exclude evidence of intelligence conclusions
if the raw intelligence that is necessary to verify the conclusions has been
destroyed.
The Court in Charkaoui II left some room for judges in other cases
to find that a failure to disclose relevant intelligence did not violate
section 7 of the Charter or section 12 of the CSIS Act when it warned
that the duty of retention was not absolute, and that “while it is true that
CSIS officers routinely take notes, they doubtless do not prepare accurate
transcripts of their interviews with the individuals they are investigating.
Finally, important information may go missing as a result of simple
human error.”126 Although these scenarios are possible, it is likely that, as
in Charkaoui II, much raw intelligence in ongoing cases will have been
deliberately destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy. It is also likely that
allegations of a failure to disclose relevant intelligence and requests for
remedies for that failure will become a staple of litigation in the ongoing
122
See Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008),
as updated ch. 9.
123
Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 49.
124
[1997] S.C.J. No. 30, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.).
125
Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.).
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Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 45.
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security certificate cases. When the raw intelligence has been retained, it
may also be necessary for the special advocate to ask permission from
the judge to consult with others to understand the full significance of the
intelligence and its reliability. Such litigation will add to the already
daunting complexities of security certificate cases, again raising the issue
of the sustainability of such procedures.127

V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF KHADR AND CHARKAOUI II AND THE
“JUDICIALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE”
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II, when
combined with the Court’s even more recent decision in McNeil, send a
clear signal to CSIS that its intelligence holdings are not exempt from
disclosure. In light of these rulings, CSIS should no longer rely on the
simplistic idea that it does not collect evidence or that CSIS agents
should destroy original notes or raw intelligence in order to ensure the
secrecy of such intelligence. Although the combined effects of these
rulings do not make CSIS a police force, they do move CSIS closer to
the practices of police officers with respect to the collection and retention
of original information. In this way, the rulings are part of the
judicialization of intelligence identified by CSIS Director Jim Judd a few
months before the release of Khadr and Charkaoui II.
A complex phenomenon such as the judicialization of intelligence
will have both positive and negative effects. Some likely effects of this
process will be outlined below before an initial judgment is made. Any
such judgment should be tentative because the process of the
judicialization of intelligence remains dynamic. It is dependent on how
CSIS, those affected by CSIS intelligence and the courts respond to the
possibility revealed in Khadr and Charkaoui II that more CSIS
intelligence will be subject to disclosure in legal proceedings.

127
For other arguments that security certificates are not sustainable in the terrorism context,
see Kent Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281 [hereinafter “Roach,
‘Charkaoui and Bill C-3’”].
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1. Possible Harms of the Judicialization of Intelligence
(a) Disclosure of Legitimate Secrets?
One possible harm of the judicialization of intelligence is that it
could result in the disclosure of secret information that will harm
confidential sources and methods used by CSIS and allied intelligence
agencies. One oft-cited example of such harms is a report that Osama bin
Laden stopped using a satellite phone following press reports that such
calls were being monitored by American intelligence agencies. The exact
accuracy of these claims has recently been questioned,128 but the
possibility that the judicialization of intelligence could lead to disclosure
of material that should be kept secret cannot be ignored. This is
especially the case given Canada’s oft-noted reliance on intelligence
provided by foreign agencies.
Claims that the Supreme Court in Khadr and Charkaoui II has been
insensitive to CSIS’s demands for secrecy cannot, however, be sustained.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that
CSIS has legitimate secrets to keep and that many of these secrets are on
loan from foreign agencies who apparently provide Canada with most of
its intelligence.129 The Supreme Court did not actually order that
intelligence be disclosed in either Khadr or Charkaoui II. Instead the
Court ordered that further proceedings be held to determine what
evidence should be disclosed. In Khadr, these proceedings involved a
specially designated judge of the Federal Court balancing competing
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure under section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act. In Charkoui II, the designated judge would be required by
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act not to disclose any
information to the detainee that would harm national security or any
person. In both cases, the Court made generous allowance for the
protection of legitimate secrets. The same is true of the more recent
McNeil case where the Court recognized that a successful claim of
privilege,130 such as informer privilege or the national security
confidentiality privilege under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act,
128
Michael Douglas Smith, “Truth in Intelligence: A Cautionary Tale” (2009) 22 Int. J of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 320.
129
Charkaoui I, supra, note 23; Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), supra, note 23.
130
The judicialization of intelligence may also produce attempts to create new privileges to
shelter intelligence from disclosure. For a recent decision recognizing a privilege for CSIS sources
that is subject to a “need to know” principle, see Re Harkat, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1823, 306 D.L.R.
(4th) 269 (F.C.).
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could prevent disclosure of relevant information either under
Stinchcombe131 or under the third party procedures articulated in
O’Connor.132
It appears unlikely that cases such as Khadr or Charkaoui II will
result in the disclosure of intelligence that will harm ongoing national
security investigations or the lives of vulnerable sources. If a judge,
however, makes a mistake and orders too much disclosure, the Attorney
General of Canada can issue a non-disclosure certificate under section
38.13 of the Canada Evidence Act to prevent disclosure under that
section. The options are a bit less clear if too much disclosure is ordered
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Under that Act,
judges are instructed not to disclose any information that would harm
national security or endanger any person and they are not allowed to
balance the competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. In some
cases, it may be possible for the government to stop disclosure by
withdrawing those parts of its allegations that make the disclosure
relevant. In an extreme case, the Court could prevent disclosure by
abandoning the security certificate proceeding.
(b) Creating False Confidence in the Accuracy of Intelligence?
Another possible danger is that the retention of raw intelligence to
allow for verification and adversarial challenge may suggest that
intelligence is actually more reliable than it is. The process of
verification and adversarial challenge will only be as accurate and
reliable as the underlying data. The fact that intelligence after Charkaoui
II may be verified against the raw intelligence will not necessarily mean
that the intelligence itself is reliable or accurate. It is also possible that
adversarial challenge of the intelligence will fail to reveal inaccuracies in
the intelligence.
Although the above dangers are real, they would exist with or
without the judicialization of intelligence that is contemplated in the
retention and disclosure of raw intelligence. Such retention and
disclosure will at least allow security-cleared special advocates an
opportunity to provide innocent explanations for raw intelligence that
might on its face confirm suspicions. It should also allow for challenges
to the methods that were used to obtain the raw intelligence, especially in
131
132
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cases where methods used abroad may potentially adversely affect the
reliability of the intelligence. The ability of the special advocate to
challenge the raw intelligence may in some cases require the special
advocate to be able to consult with the detainee or others after having
seen the raw intelligence.133 A refusal to allow the special advocate to
engage in such consultations could impair that person’s ability to
challenge the intelligence and could increase the chance that unreliable
intelligence will wrongly be perceived as reliable.
There is a danger that retention and disclosure of the raw intelligence
may create a false confidence in intelligence that may have been
selectively collected and may not be reliable. That said, the danger of
overly filtered or unreliable intelligence would persist even in the
absence of cases such as Charkaoui II. The retention and disclosure of
the raw intelligence at least provides some opportunity for verification
and adversarial challenge.
(c) Increased Retention of Intelligence as a Threat to Privacy?
The most serious danger of a judicialization of intelligence that
results in increased retention of raw intelligence is its potential threat to
privacy. Charkaoui II could promote a process that Stanley A. Cohen has
referred to as “dossier building” where intelligence, including dubious
intelligence based on rumours, associations and unsubstantiated suspicions,
is retained perhaps permanently on file or more likely in an accessible
electronic database.134 It would technologically be possible for CSIS to
retain far more files on individuals than the former Security Service of
the RCMP, which was criticized by the McDonald Commission for the
extensive files that it held on many Canadians, including some who were
participating in legitimate forms of dissent and even some in minority
political parties such as the Parti Québécois and the New Democratic
Party.
133
Such consultations after the special advocate has seen the secret information would have
to be authorized by the judge under s. 85.2(c), as amended, to respond to Charkaoui I, supra, note
23. For discussion of this section, see Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3”, supra, note 127, at 315-17.
134
Stanley Cohen has argued that given its emphasis on the risk of future harm rather than
concrete events, “an intelligence dossier will naturally contain a range of information, including
much that is unsifted or unfiltered, as well as innuendo, hearsay and speculation. … The intelligence
practices of the national security world would encourage the amassing of detailed information for
possible future linkage. This leads to dossier building and the creation of generalized suspect lists.”
Stanley A. Cohen, Privacy, Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2005), at 404.
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A possible answer to these privacy concerns, however, can be found
in CSIS’s mandate and its review structure. Section 12 of the CSIS Act
restricts the collection of intelligence to that which is strictly necessary to
investigate reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada as
defined in section 2 of the Act. Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate
on the meaning of this part of section 12 in its decision in Charkaoui II.
This was a missed opportunity by the Court to flesh out how the concept
of reasonable suspicion, recognized in other parts of the law,135 applies to
CSIS’s investigations of threats to the security of Canada. Moreover, the
Court could also have explored how principles of proportionality
articulated by the McDonald Commission and in its own section 1
jurisprudence might have informed and disciplined the requirement that
even in cases of reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada,
CSIS should only collect intelligence to the extent that it is strictly
necessary for the investigation. These are critical parts of section 12 of
the CSIS Act that the Court could have interpreted in response to the
legitimate concerns that it discussed that CSIS’s increased retention of
intelligence could harm privacy.
Now that the Supreme Court has clarified that section 12 does not
justify the destruction of raw intelligence, it will be even more important
for CSIS and its review bodies to ensure that CSIS only collects
intelligence pursuant to its lawful mandate. This is an important part of
the project of subjecting CSIS to the rule of law. In this sense, Charkaoui
II is only relevant to one part of the intelligence cycle, namely, the
retention of raw intelligence that is the basis for CSIS’s analysis and
conclusions. Given that raw intelligence is much more likely to be
collected after Charkaoui II, it becomes even more important to ensure
that the intelligence is properly and lawfully collected pursuant to CSIS’s
mandate. This process would be facilitated if CSIS was able to provide
more public information about its targeting process and if SIRC devoted
more attention to this critical topic in its annual public reports about its
review of CSIS.

135

Most recently in R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.).
See also R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
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2. Possible Benefits of the Judicialization of Intelligence
(a) Disclosure as a Means to Reveal Tunnel Vision and Other Errors in
Intelligence?
The Court in Charkaoui II stressed that retention of the original notes
or raw intelligence was required to ensure that both the Ministers and the
reviewing judges could discharge their duties under the statutory scheme.
In both cases, the Ministers and reviewing judges should have access to
the original data and notes to ensure the accuracy of the analytical reports
and conclusions that CSIS prepared.136 The Court recognized that the
analytical reports prepared by intelligence agencies could be overstated
or just plain wrong. If criminal trials can reach wrong conclusions about
guilt or innocence, it should hardly be surprising that intelligence
analysis which is conducted in secret and without adversarial challenge
may also be wrong. Nevertheless, sensational but erroneous conclusions
made by those who have secret raw intelligence — for example,
conclusions that Maher Arar and his wife were associated with Al Qaeda
or that five of the September 11 terrorists entered the United States from
Canada137 — have an unfortunate way of sticking around long after the
original data for such conclusions has been found to be lacking.
Lest it be thought that it is only lawyers who are concerned about the
fallibility of intelligence, much of the writing by intelligence practitioners
and scholars today accepts the possibility if not the inevitability that
intelligence analysts will at times reach conclusions that are wrong,
including some conclusions that are not supported by the underlying
data. As Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, two leading intelligence scholars,
have observed, intelligence “remains an intellectual process … However
many ‘facts’ are compiled or integrated they still do not ‘speak for
136

Supra, note 4, at para. 62. The Court observed:
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational notes compromises
the very function of judicial review. To uphold the right to procedural fairness of people
in Mr. Charkaoui’s position, CSIS should be required to retain all the information in its
possession and to disclose it to the ministers and the designated judge. The ministers and
the designated judge will in turn be responsible for verifying the information they are
given. If, as we suggest, the ministers have access to all the undestroyed “original”
evidence, they will be better positioned to make appropriate decisions on issuing a
certificate. The designated judge, who will have access to all the evidence, will then
exclude any evidence that might pose a threat to national security and summarize the
remaining evidence — which he or she will have been able to check for accuracy and
reliability — for the named person.
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themselves’.”138 A former CIA analyst has written that “in order to tell
decisionmakers about what is going on overseas and who is doing it,
intelligence analysts spend much of their time linking disparate data
together to either ‘connect the dots’ or ‘create the mosaic’.” He adds that
“because raw intelligence data … is usually fragmentary — providing an
incomplete picture of what is actually going on overseas or in the mind
of the adversary — the gaps in the data must be filled in with
assumptions drawn from various sources, running from the theoretical
literature to the analysts’ idiosyncratic judgment.”139 Intelligence analysis
is an inherently creative process, but it should be disciplined by the
ability to check the analysis against the raw data. This is especially
important when individuals will be harmed as a result of the intelligence
analysis.
Recent and spectacular intelligence failures include the failure to
connect the dots of September 11 and the false connection of the dots
with respect to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Richard Betts has
argued that intelligence failures are inevitable because of the ambiguity
of much raw intelligence and the need for intelligence analysts to provide
governments with workable advice.140 Another former intelligence
analyst for the CIA has stressed that “intelligence collection systems
produce sensory data, not intelligence. Only the human mind can add the
discernment and knowledge that makes sense of it. It is only after ‘raw’
data are verified for accuracy and evaluated for significance can they
become the substance of intelligence.”141
Richard Heuer Jr., who worked within the CIA from 1951 to 1979
and who retired as the head of the methodology unit in the Director of
Intelligence’s political analysis office, has warned of the dangers of
premature closure, selective perception of relevant facts, cognitive biases
and not considering alternative hypotheses.142 In what in the criminal
justice context would be called tunnel vision, he has observed that
“people do not naturally seek disconfirming evidence, and when such
138
Peter Gill & Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2006), at 84.
139
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140
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evidence is received it tends to be discounted.”143 Heuer has warned that
intelligence analysis is closer to the process of writing history than
conducting scientific analysis.144 Another person who works in military
intelligence has drawn on Heuer’s work to warn:
humans are prone to self-confirmation in cases where equivocal
information exists or, in other words, ‘we perceive what we expect to
perceive’. A wealth of research has demonstrated the human tendency
to search out and attend only to evidence that confirms one’s ideas,
beliefs, or hypotheses. The problem with the confirmatory tendency is
that only information supportive of one’s beliefs is attended to, even in
the face of extremely disconfirming information. Information that could
provide corrective feedback that one’s beliefs are in error is rarely
evaluated. This process of searching for confirmation can lead to some
very inaccurate conclusions, and may lead to an increased, perhaps
unjustified, confidence in one’s conclusions.145

All of this analysis suggests that CSIS, as much as the Court, should be
concerned about preserving raw intelligence so that it can verify the
accuracy of its analytical intelligence.
The Court’s repeated references in Charkaoui II to the ability of
Ministers and judges to verify intelligence against raw intelligence
alludes to the increased recognition of the fallibility of the intelligence
product. In this sense, the decision is very much influenced by the
findings that the Arar Commission and SIRC respectively reached in the
Maher Arar and Bhupindar Liddar cases that unsupported and erroneous
conclusions had been drawn in the intelligence process in a manner that
harmed these men. The Court’s decision is designed to allow the relevant
decision-makers to review the raw data on which CSIS bases its analysis.
Retention of the raw data increases the accountability of CSIS and
provides a basis for a Minister or a judge to ask CSIS some very hard
questions. That said, the check on CSIS is still limited by whether the
raw intelligence has already been destroyed pursuant to the CSIS policy
found deficient in Charkaoui II and by the reliability and relevance of the
raw data itself.
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(b) Increased Adjudicative Fairness?
The ultimate objective of the proceedings in Khadr and Charkaoui II
is to increase the fairness of the proceedings that both men face. Omar
Khadr’s ability to defend himself in American proceedings could
potentially be improved by the disclosure of the interviews he had with
CSIS officials and by information that CSIS shared with the Americans.
The adequacy of the disclosure that Khadr will receive from American
officials remains very much in doubt.146 Unfortunately, the disclosure
obligations articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in his case are
defined narrowly in a manner that mirrors the limited extra-territorial
reach of the Charter. In other words, the Court has limited disclosure to
information collected or shared with the Americans as a direct
consequence of the Guantanamo interviews that implicated Canada in an
international human rights violation. The disclosure obligations in Khadr
do not extend to other Stinchcombe-relevant material that Canada
possesses, including material that it has shared with the Americans that is
not related to the interviews. These restrictions on disclosure impose real
limits on how helpful the decision will be to Omar Khadr. A broader
definition of what should be disclosed to Khadr would not have
threatened legitimate secrecy interests because the government would
still have been able to argue that the information was not relevant to the
charges faced by Khadr and that the information was privileged by
national security confidentiality. Such a tailored approach is better than
imposing broad and categorical restrictions on disclosure that have the
potential to deny important and even potentially exculpatory information
to the accused.
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui II at first blush seems more
generous to the affected person because it defines the disclosure
obligations more broadly than Khadr. The Court in Charkaoui II was
appropriately aware of the severe consequences of the security certificate
process and the fact that section 7 of the Charter is not restricted to the
criminal process. The Court in Charkaoui II laid to rest any idea that
section 12 of the CSIS Act provides a statutory justification for the
146
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124
S.Ct. 2633 (2004) seemed to approve of significant departures from traditional criminal law
standards of adjudicative fairness but the United States Supreme Court has subsequently found
existing standards at Guantanamo Bay to be unconstitutional: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). The dissenters in
Boumediene, however, specifically complained that the majority had not dealt with issues such as
disclosure when it declared that the Guantanamo detainees should have access to habeas corpus.
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destruction of properly collected intelligence. At the same time,
Charkaoui II did not actually order that the interview notes or other raw
intelligence be disclosed to the detainee. Much of this material may
already have been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy. The Court rejected
a stay of proceedings as a drastic and premature remedy for such
destruction. Even to the extent that the material has been retained, the
Court recognized that the judge would still have to filter out any material
that if disclosed would harm national security or any person. To be sure,
there are benefits in terms of adjudicative fairness in allowing Ministers,
reviewing judges and security-cleared special advocates to see all the raw
and available intelligence. At the same time, however, Charkaoui II may
not dramatically increase the actual disclosure made to the detainee. Such
conclusions are troubling for adjudicative fairness,147 but as discussed
above, they also belie any claim that the Court has effectively opened
CSIS’s vaults to public disclosure. The value of Charkaoui II in terms of
adjudicative fairness may well depend on what the special advocates can
do with the raw intelligence. As suggested above, special advocates may
find it necessary to return to the detainee or others in order to assess the
broader context and meaning of raw intelligence to which they may gain
access under Charkaoui II.
(c) Increased Accountability for CSIS?
Disclosure of CSIS intelligence not only has the potential to increase
the fairness of legal proceedings, but it can also provide a valuable
accountability check on the accuracy, fairness and precision of the
analytical conclusions that CSIS draws from its raw intelligence. The
Court in Charkaoui II was influenced by Commissioner O’Connor’s
finding that an analytical conclusion (admittedly made by the RCMP and
not by CSIS) that Maher Arar and his wife were Islamic extremists
associated with Al Qaeda was inaccurate. Full disclosure of the original
intelligence is a necessary precondition to ensuring that the conclusions
reached by intelligence analysts are fair, accurate and supported by the
raw intelligence.
The Court seemed to believe that the Ministers of Public Safety and
Immigration who decide to issue security certificates would be in a
147
For a recent recognition that a detainee’s rights may be threatened when the bulk of the
government’s case is only disclosed to special advocates, see A. v. United Kingdom, App. No.
3455/05 (2009) (European Court of Human Rights), at para. 220.
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position to verify the intelligence provided by CSIS to justify the signing
of a security certificate and to justify the maintenance of the security
certificate process. Although the Ministers do have this responsibility, it
is not clear how well they have discharged the responsibility given their
other responsibilities and position within the government. The Ministers
may be tempted to defer to CSIS’s expertise in evaluating intelligence,
but they should now have access to all the relevant intelligence before
they decide to sign a security certificate. It is also noteworthy that the
Ministers have not signed a security certificate in a case with allegations
of terrorism since they signed Mr. Charkaoui’s certificate in 2003.
The reviewing judge is in a better position than the Ministers to
verify CSIS’s analysis against the raw intelligence. The reviewing judge
may have or develop expertise in intelligence matters and the judge enjoys
the protections of judicial independence. In addition, the judge should be
assisted by adversarial arguments provided by detainees and special
advocates that even the most diligent and expert Minister will not be able
to access.
Although CSIS’s review body SIRC already should have access to
all CSIS material, it should also benefit from Charkaoui II to the extent
that the decision requires CSIS to retain the original intelligence it
collects about specific individuals or groups. The Court quoted from a
SIRC decision in the Liddar case that had expressed frustration with the
fact that interview notes originally taken by CSIS in the course of a
security clearance interview were unavailable. After Charkaoui II, SIRC,
which has the statutory ability to see all information held by CSIS with
the sole exception of Cabinet confidences,148 should be in a better
position to verify CSIS’s analysis and conclusions against the raw
intelligence. This is an important side benefit of the Court’s decision and
again underlines that Charkaoui II has effects far beyond the security
certificate context.
(d) Increased Cooperation Between CSIS and Law Enforcement?
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui II rejects the blunt and outdated
idea that CSIS is not involved with the collection of evidence that was
articulated by the Pitfield Committee in 1983 and reflected in the trial
judge’s original decision that disclosure was not required because CSIS
was not a police force or involved with the enforcement of the criminal
148
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law. In the late 1990s, the Security Intelligence Review Committee
identified Stinchcombe and the fear of disclosure as a significant
impediment to CSIS and RCMP cooperation. The trial judge in the Air
India trial found that CSIS had violated section 7 of the Charter by its
destruction of the Parmar wiretaps and the original notes of interviews
with important witnesses. To the extent that the judicialization of
intelligence represented by cases such as Charkaoui II requires CSIS to
retain intelligence and to deal with the possibility that intelligence might
be disclosed in legal proceedings, such a process should make it easier
for CSIS to work with law enforcement.
Greater attention to evidentiary standards in the collection and
retention of intelligence may be one of those happy scenarios where
reforms can both improve the fairness of the process for those who may
be accused of terrorism and improve the effectiveness of the system that
society uses to prevent the very real dangers of terrorism. Such results,
however, will depend on CSIS accepting the judicialization of
intelligence process identified by Mr. Judd and promoted by Khadr,
Charkaoui II and McNeil.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Charkaoui II,149 Khadr150 and
McNeil151 are all consistent with the judicialization of intelligence thesis
articulated by Jim Judd shortly before the release of those decisions. All
three decisions send signals to CSIS that the intelligence that it collects
may be subject to disclosure in subsequent proceedings. Charkaoui II is
the most important of the decisions for CSIS because it finds that longstanding CSIS policies that required the destruction of raw intelligence
are contrary to section 12 of the CSIS Act and, in the security certificate
context at least, contrary to section 7 of the Charter. Charkaoui II
represents a fundamental challenge to the way that CSIS has destroyed
original intelligence in the name of secrecy.
Jim Judd did not really address whether the judicialization of
intelligence was a positive or negative development. This is understandable
given his position, but it will be important that CSIS not resist the trends
that Mr. Judd has identified and that it not demonstrate too much
149
150
151
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attachment to or nostalgia for its long-standing policy of destroying raw
intelligence. Some might argue that the judicialization of intelligence
places legitimate and important secrets collected by CSIS and shared
with CSIS by allied agencies at risk. At their crudest, such claims amount
to attacks that lawyers and judges do not understand the security threats
that Canada faces or the legitimate needs for secrecy to protect sources
and CSIS’s relations with allied agencies. Such claims are difficult to
sustain given the Court’s refusal in both Khadr and Charkaoui II actually
to order that intelligence be disclosed. In both cases, the government was
given ample opportunity to justify to the courts the need for nondisclosure of sensitive intelligence. Some within intelligence agencies
might object to having to convince judges of the need and justification
for secrecy, but such objections are really objections to CSIS being
subject to the rule of law. Such objections are inconsistent with the post1982 rejection of absolute state prerogatives to assert unreviewable
claims of secrecy.
Other weightier objections can be made against the judicialization of
intelligence. One concern is that the process of verification of
intelligence analysis against raw intelligence promoted by Charkaoui II
might create unwarranted confidence in the reliability and probative
value of intelligence. The verification process that is promoted by
Charkaoui II can reveal some errors in intelligence analysis, but it should
also be remembered that even verified intelligence will only be as
accurate and precise as the original raw data. The collection of the raw
data may be skewed and the raw data may be wrong or unreliable. Even
when verified against raw intelligence, intelligence of the sort that is
used to support security certificates may still remain much less reliable
than evidence. Intelligence may be obtained from foreign agencies in
circumstances that are not conducive to respect for human rights.
Intelligence may, as in the case of Maher Arar and other Canadians held
abroad, be based on false confessions made to avoid torture or
mistreatment. Intelligence linking persons to terrorism could be verified
against the original raw intelligence, but the intelligence could still be
wrong if the original information was a false confession or
misinformation. In many cases, little may be known about how foreign
agencies obtained the information and so the reliability of the
intelligence will not be clear. Intelligence can be based on untested and
untestable hearsay, including rumour and reputation evidence. It may
view ambiguous behaviour and associations through an interpretative
lens that can make the agency’s predictions about security threats
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something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The retention of intelligence
under Charkaoui II provides some potential correctives, but intelligence,
even when verified against the raw intelligence that has been collected,
will remain fallible.
The most serious concern about Charkaoui II is that it could lead to
increased retention of massive amounts of raw intelligence in a manner
that will threaten privacy. CSIS could respond to Charkaoui II by
retaining everything it collects in the vast majority of its targeted
investigations. Although the Court was not oblivious to privacy
concerns, its limitation of the duty to retain intelligence to investigations
that target individuals and groups is no real limitation if over 90 per cent
of CSIS targeted investigations still target specific groups and
individuals as opposed to general causes and events. CSIS’s mandate
means that it should generally target individuals and groups because the
targeting of events and causes is less discriminating and can catch more
legitimate dissent. Nevertheless, the targeting of individuals and groups,
combined with the duty to retain intelligence in Charkaoui II, modern
information technology and the expanded resources that CSIS has
received since September 11, means that CSIS could collect and retain a
staggering amount of intelligence. Given this, CSIS and its review bodies
must pay close attention to restrictions on its ability to collect
intelligence and it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Charkaoui II
did not address how section 12 of the CSIS Act restricts CSIS to the
collection of intelligence that is strictly necessary to investigate
reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada.
Although Charkaoui II presents some dangers, its potential benefits
are great. Increased retention of intelligence may play a role in helping
CSIS work better with law enforcement. This has the potential to benefit
both society through more effective investigations and prosecutions and
the accused to the extent that the intelligence collected and retained by
CSIS may assist the accused in his or her defence. CSIS like police
forces must be reminded that it has a duty to look for and collect
exculpatory as well as incriminatory material and it should follow the
best thinking within intelligence agencies which recognizes the dangers
of confirmation bias or tunnel vision in the collection and analysis of
intelligence.
Increased disclosure obligations have the potential to increase the
accountability of CSIS and to ensure that its analytical product is subject
to full adversarial challenge. As the Court repeatedly stressed in
Charkaoui II, the retention of raw intelligence provides an important
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opportunity for both internal and external testing of the validity of
CSIS’s analytical conclusions. Much recent writing about intelligence by
intelligence scholars and practitioners recognizes the fallibility of the
analysis process and to this extent Charkaoui II should not be dismissed
by CSIS as a decision that imposes alien lawyers’ values on the security
intelligence world. At the same time, Charkaoui II follows in the
tradition of other section 7 decisions that have concerned themselves
with the possibility of miscarriages of justice that harm the innocent.
The Court’s decision in Khadr to limit CSIS’s disclosure obligations
to the extent to which the Charter would be applied extra-territorially in
response to hopefully rare international human rights violations by
Canadian officials, however, is unfortunate. Khadr limits the ability of
disclosure to prevent intelligence errors and to provide accountability for
CSIS’s extra-territorial work. This again reaffirms the need for review
agencies to be given sufficient resources and powers to match the
increased resources and powers given to intelligence and other agencies
with national security responsibilities.
The ability of the judicialization of intelligence to produce increased
adjudicative fairness for persons such as Omar Khadr and Adil
Charkaoui remains to be determined. It is significant that the Court did
not actually order the disclosure of intelligence in either case. The
promise of disclosure in each case will require judges to resist any
overclaiming of secrecy by the government. In the security certificate
context, a significant amount of the raw intelligence may only be
disclosed to special advocates. It will be important that special advocates
have the necessary information from detainees and others to engage in
full and informed adversarial challenge of the raw intelligence. To this
extent the success of Charkaoui II may depend on the success of the
reforms initiated by Charkaoui I.
As Jim Judd accurately predicted, the judicialization of intelligence
is an important change and challenge for intelligence agencies. It is a
process that is likely to continue in a post-Cold War environment where
there is increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and the rights of those
accused of involvement in terrorism. Given this, it will be best if CSIS
accepts Charkaoui II and the duty to retain intelligence for possible
disclosure, and abandons any nostalgia it may have for a world in which
intelligence could be collected, analyzed, and destroyed so that it could
be kept secret forever.
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POSTSCRIPT
On July 8, 2009 and subsequent to the completion of this paper, the
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) took the extraordinary
step of publishing an unclassified report on CSIS’s involvement in the
Omar Khadr case. This report provides independent confirmation of the
phenomenon of the judicialization of intelligence identified by Jim Judd
and discussed at length in this paper.
The SIRC report found that post-September 11 terrorism investigations
have “blurred the line between the work of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, and thus between intelligence and evidence”.
CSIS information is more frequently being used in legal proceedings and
“intelligence that is found to have been gathered in circumstances that
violated domestic laws or international conventions will not only be
rendered useless in the courtroom, but more importantly, will bring
discredit to the Service”.152 In other words, CSIS needs to respect
evidentiary standards in its terrorism investigations both to preserve its
own reputation and to ensure that it can cooperate with law enforcement
agencies.
SIRC recommended that “CSIS can no longer carry out its mandate
solely from an intelligence-gathering perspective. Political, judicial and
legal developments post 9/11 are forcing the Service to take a less insular
approach to its work and to consider various extra-intelligence factors”,153
most notably the need to respect human rights and evidentiary standards.
It called on the Minister of Public Safety to provide guidance and advice
to CSIS to help it “undertake a fundamental re-assessment of how it
conducts business, and to undergo a cultural shift in order to keep pace
with the political, judicial and legal developments of recent years”.154 As
suggested in the first part of this paper, CSIS must abandon Cold War
policies that maximized secrecy and rejected the idea that intelligence
would ever be disclosed in legal proceedings.
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In completing its important report, SIRC examined all hard copy and
electronic documents held by CSIS relating to Omar Khadr between May
2002 and September 2005. It found no legal documentation of a legal
opinion being obtained by CSIS before it questioned Omar Khadr for
intelligence purposes at Guantanamo despite widespread reports of
abuses at the military base at the time.155 It also found that the United
States insisted as a condition of the visits that it record CSIS interviews
with Omar Khadr,156 thus making the issue of information sharing that
was the focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr somewhat
academic. CSIS did, however, share its analytical reports from the Khadr
interviews with American agencies, the RCMP and the DFAIT. CSIS
maintains that the Khadr interviews produced undisclosed but “important
intelligence gains” albeit ones that were “not particularly helpful in terms
of offering new investigative leads”.157
SIRC criticized CSIS both for failing to obtain a legal opinion before
interviewing Omar Khadr and for failing to take into account his position
as a youth who “been kept incommunicado and been denied access to
legal counsel, consular representation or family members”.158 SIRC also
interpreted the Federal Court’s injunction which prevented further
interviews at Guantanamo159 and the Supreme Court’s decision requiring
disclosure of those interviews160 as a “message” from the courts that
“CSIS can no longer undertake its activities solely through the insular
lens of intelligence-gathering, rather it must consider the wider
environment and implications within which its work is carried out. This
includes both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
Canada’s obligations under international law.”161
The SIRC report is a helpful and influential confirmation of the
growing judicialization of intelligence that is supported by the
Charkaoui II,162 Khadr163 and McNeil164 cases discussed in this paper. It
goes beyond Jim Judd’s recognition of the judicialization of intelligence
as a phenomenon that is making CSIS’s work more difficult to argue that
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CSIS must move beyond its Cold War origins and should accept the
increased accountability and fairness that come with the exposure of
intelligence to disclosure in legal proceedings.

